



FRANCE AND POLAND FACING THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Barbara JANKOWSKI and Amélie ZIMA (eds.)

É T U D E S





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INTRODUCTION

Barbara JANKOWSKI and Amélie ZIMA

The purpose of this study is to propose an analysis of the security environment in the late 2010s. For several years now, the states of the European continent have been facing renewed tensions and political uncertainties. On the one hand, the annexation of Crimea, which constitutes a major break in respect of international law, and the war in the Ukrainian Donbass impacts the European stability. On the other hand, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States has raised many questions and instilled doubt about solidarity among allies. Brexit poses a challenge to the construction of the European Union since, for the first time, a state has used article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty allowing the exit of a state, which means that the debate on the EU's future no longer only concerns the practical criteria for deepening European integration but also the appropriateness of this integration.

However, the initiatives of European states demonstrate their resilience and their ability to respond to security challenges. Since 2017, a majority of European Union states have engaged in the renewal of European defence by launching the European Defence Fund and PESCO, already envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty, but having now undergone an operational implementation.

These events and initiatives therefore profoundly question the evolution of the two regional organizations, NATO and the EU, the link between these two organizations and, consequently, the transatlantic relationship.

In this context, this study aims to present the views and analysis of two major states for the European Union and NATO: Poland and France. Because of the budget that these two countries devote to defence and because of their place in the decision-making process of the two organizations and their role in the missions, it is necessary to carefully consider their views and policies by calling upon researchers from both countries.

This study offers a reflection on the threats and their perceptions. The articles show that the priorities are not the same for France and

Poland. Whereas Russia is the main threat to Poland, it is only one of the major threats to France, after terrorism and the situation in the Sahel-Saharan strip. However, these different perceptions of threats do not exclude finding points of convergence since only the order of priorities differs between the two countries.

The analyses developed in this study also challenge some stereotypes. So, although Russia is the main threat to Poland, opinion polls show that the Polish population is divided on this issue. Similarly, while Polish governments are traditionally labelled as Atlanticists, the analyses show that Warsaw has supported all recent initiatives to develop European defence, not to mention the fact that the European Defence Fund project was carried by the Polish Commissioner in charge of the internal market and industry, Elzbieta Bienkowska. In the same way, the study also gives reason to reconsider the term of inertia frequently attributed to the EU. While the EU is said to be an organization with a complex decision-making process resulting in slow decisions, the establishment of the European Defence Fund and PESCO in fact show the responsiveness of the EU and its Member States. Finally, the revival of European defence might accredit the thesis according to which, in this domain, Brexit could constitute a major window of opportunity.

The study is not limited to international organizations such as the Atlantic Alliance or the European Union. In order to understand the security and defence policies and their context, we found it essential to take into account the dynamics of national arenas. This is why the study also examines how public opinion in the two countries perceives security, international issues, military interventions and the armed forces themselves. The integration of the armed forces in the nation is part of the security environment. As there is no military action without a political decision, the issue of support for the military and their missions arises, over the long term, if not in the immediate present. This support must be considered as an indicator of the legitimacy of a military intervention, a political decision par excellence.

This publication gathers together eight articles presenting the analysis of Polish and French researchers on the evolution of the security environment, first presented in a conference organized in Paris, at the École militaire on November 24, 2017, by the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM). This conference followed a preliminary seminar

held on May 22 and 23, 2014 at the University of Warsaw, on “The Future of European Security. The Point of View of Poland and France” and a joint publication *La Pologne, un acteur de la défense européenne* (Poland, an actor in European defence) published online on the IRSEM website.¹

In the first part, the study provides an analysis of Polish and French security strategies. The first text, by Justyna Zajac, shows that in Poland security is perceived, to a large extent, in a traditional manner as so-called “hard security.” It concentrates on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of borders. Even though Poland’s national security strategies adopted in 2000, 2003, and 2007 and the White Book on security of 2013 adopted a more wide-range understanding of security, threats of a non-military nature have not been a leading cause of concern for Polish decision makers. In the post-Cold War era, the main goal of Polish security policy has remained intact: protection against Russia. Moreover, in the last decade, the perception of Russia as a threat to Poland—along with a redistribution of power in the international system, a declining position of the West, and a revisionist policy in Russia—has been on the rise. This trend has been prominent in the *Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021* adopted by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2017.

The second text is an analysis of the recent French Strategic Review by Édouard Jolly and Colonel Olivier Passot. Their article provides a framework of the French strategic understanding of the recent security threats and the most important challenges for France and EU members in the years to come. They underline different questions raised by the evolution of an unstable strategic environment combined with active sources of uncertainty. What are the types of challenges France has to face? How will it be possible to maintain and develop the strategic autonomy of the French armed forces, taking into account the international balance of power? Although Islamic extremism remains a latent political issue for France, this should not distract from other challenging issues of the next decades.

1. See IRSEM, *La Pologne, un acteur de la défense européenne*, Dossier stratégique de la Lettre de l’IRSEM 3/2014. There is also a version in Polish. <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/269748/3369898/file/Lettre%203%202014.pdf>.

In the second part, the study provides a reflection on the changes that have taken place in the transatlantic relationship, NATO and the EU with the election of Trump, Brexit and the renewal of European defence.

Paweł Olszewski examines the challenges the European Union is facing today, plunged in various crises and focused on their long-term resolution. The focus of the EU on emerging internal challenges has resulted in its closure, leaving external issues in the background. At the same time, new threats have emerged. He underlines the lack of perception at the EU level of the expectations of the citizens of Member States and of the other countries. For the author, it seems that EU decision makers and officials do not see the specific concerns of individual countries, do not take into account their history, tradition and current situation, and thus are unable to approach the issues in a different way. They do not look at the emerging challenges and problems from a different perspective and do not look for solutions that would be adequate and acceptable to all parties.

Pierre Haroche's article looks back at the causes of the revival of European defence in the 2010s. Several cyclical factors can explain this recovery: financial reasons, such as the crisis encouraging economies of scale, security reasons such as terrorism and political reasons, such as the election of Trump or Brexit. While the Member States have largely supported this revival, Haroche nevertheless points out that the EU is facing a geostrategic dilemma: the need to face security issues in both the South and East. However, from the example of EUFOR Bangui, he shows that this dilemma can be overcome by transactions between Member States.

For his part, Marek Madej shows that two factors affect the transatlantic relationship: American leadership, which has become unpredictable and transactional, and the rise of populism in Europe. In this uncertain context, however, NATO faces major challenges. The first is the ability to ensure the sustainability of NATO 360°. The second is the willingness of states to allocate 2% of their budget to defence. However, the author shows that this figure should not be a fetish and, taking the example of Greece and Denmark, he points out that the analysis must above all take into account how this sum is used, particularly in terms of modernization. Finally, he considers possible changes

in the relationship between NATO and the EU, particularly as a result of the establishment of PESCO.

Amélie Zima proposes a reflection on NATO by showing that it finds itself in a moment of fragility for several reasons. On the one hand, the election of Donald Trump creates uncertainties about the security guarantee of Article 5. On the other hand, the revival of European defence questions the transatlantic link and could lead to review the NATO-EU agreements that date back to 2002 and are no longer adapted to the current strategic environment. The author also shows that NATO is politically weakened by the authoritarian wave affecting several of its members (Hungary, Poland and Turkey). Finally, NATO is also facing a return of the Russian question. This is a clear example of the failure of Atlantic policy to create a liberal and democratic Euro-Atlantic order through agreements and partnerships, pointing also to the need for NATO to overcome logistical problems as well as consider drawing up a new strategic concept.

Finally, the third part of the study is devoted to the relations between the armed forces and society in both countries. Marcin Sinczuch explains how three processes have influenced the perception of the armed forces by civilian society in Poland: joining NATO, integrating the EU and ending compulsory military service, but the most important element is that the military had moved away from communism. Today the armed forces are one of the most highly respected institutions in Poland. Historically associated with the survival of the homeland, the military is a part of cultural identity. However, the armed forces are more supported by rural, male populations from the eastern part of the territory. The level of confidence of Poles is still ten points lower than the average of EU states, and this applies to all public institutions in the country. The attractiveness of military jobs is high among young people, and the newly created territorial defence army (WOT) is perceived positively. A majority of Poles approves of the defence policy and supports the soldiers, but not automatically the missions that they are responsible for implementing.

Barbara Jankowski considers two dimensions of the civil-military relationship in France. First, the relations between the military and society taken as a whole, measured through public opinion polls on the image of the armed forces and the legitimacy of their missions.

Secondly, the relations between military chiefs and civilian decision makers assessed through qualitative research based on interviews and content analysis of media reports, public statements and memoirs. In comparison with the sixties, public opinion on the military has improved in every respect. The image of the military has become very positive over the past two decades, and the French have great confidence in the military compared to other institutions. The whole spectrum of military missions is perceived as legitimate, even though the French are more in favour of the missions of protection of the national territory or of French citizens than missions abroad. Concerning the civil-military relations at the decision-making level, the Algerian War legacy is never very far from the narratives and social representations of the actors. The relations between the military top ranks and decision makers are always complex to apprehend, but they have much improved since the mid-nineties, essentially because of the numerous military interventions, the progress in the training of high-ranking officers, enhancing the skills needed to have an influence and a redefined role of the Chief of Defence Staff since 2005.

POLISH PERCEPTION OF SECURITY THREATS AND CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Justyna ZAJĄC

Justyna Zajęc is professor of international relations at the University of Warsaw. Her research interests focus on Poland's foreign policy, the transatlantic security system as well as EU and U.S. foreign and security policy. She served on the Commission of National Security Strategic Review appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland Bronisław Komorowski (2011–2012). Author of many books and articles. Her latest publication is *Poland's Security Policy. The West, Russia and the Changing International Order*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2016.

ABSTRACT

Security in Poland is perceived, to a large extent, in a traditional manner as so-called “hard security.” It concentrates on the political and military aspects and is focused on protecting values such as survival, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, internal stability, and the inviolability of borders. Even though Poland's national security strategies adopted in 2000, 2003, and 2007 and the White Book on security of 2013 adopted a more wide-ranging understanding of security, threats of a non-military nature have not been a leading cause for concern for Polish decision makers. In the post-Cold War era, the main goal of Polish security policy has remained intact: protection against Russia. Moreover, in the last decade, the perception of Russia as a threat to Poland, along with a redistribution of power in the international system has been on the rise. This trend has been prominent in the *Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021* adopted by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2017.

RUSSIA'S REVISIONIST POLICY AS A MAJOR SECURITY THREAT

In the 21st century, ensuring protection against Russia has been a pivot of Polish security policy. The *Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021*, adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2017, states that Poland's security environment has considerably deteriorated as a result of Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the Russian-provoked conflict in eastern Ukraine. The document notes that "not since World War II has the European political landscape seen such a level of open hostility, aggression against sovereign neighbours, and violation of territorial integrity."¹ It also emphasizes that Russia's aggressive drives for domination over ex-Soviet territories have undermined Europe's security architecture, and it points to the failure of the West to respond adequately to Russia's revisionist policy as one of the causes of this process.

What is more, according to the *Strategy*, it is the situation in Eastern Europe that will continue to present Poland's foreign policy with its most formidable challenges in the years to come. The region has experienced a steady decline in stability and predictability, both foreign and domestic. Russia has greatly contributed to this downward trend by fuelling ethnic conflicts, reviving historic disputes between the nations it once controlled, spreading disinformation, and engaging in corruption. If these tactics fail, the document notes, Russia resorts to the use of military force, as illustrated by the wars in Georgia and Ukraine. In the same vein, Russia's annexation of Crimea and Russian support for the separatist movements in the Donbas, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria are blamed for undermining stability in Eastern Europe. Said trends are likely to continue, increasing the risk of political and social turmoil in Poland's immediate neighbourhood. Aggression below a threshold of open warfare and the use of a hybrid war by Russia are also to be expected.²

Truth be told, the fear that Russia may return to its imperial policy has continually been present in Polish security policy throughout the post-Cold War period. It should also be noted that this fear has its roots

1. *Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, p. 6.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

in Poland's geopolitical location and historical experiences.³ Since the 18th century, Poland's fate has hung in the balance due to its precarious geographic location between Germany and Russia. Consequently, throughout the greater part of its modern history Poland has had to fight for its survival. As a result, the perception of the "struggle for survival" has become part of the Polish national identity and strategic culture. New geopolitical circumstances of the 1990s have to a major extent allowed Poland to largely overcome its apprehension of Germany. However, distrust of Russia has remained unchanged. In the 1990s, Russia was a vulnerable country in the grip of internal instabilities, which temporarily diminished the perceived threat from the Kremlin, but with Vladimir Putin's ascendance to power in 2000, Russia began to rebuild its international influence and challenge the West's dominant global position. During the February 2007 Munich security conference, President Putin openly questioned the hegemonic position of the USA and called for the building of a multipolar international order, in which Russia would occupy a position equal to that of the US. This was a clear signal that Russia was ready to contest the post-Cold War international order.

As far as Poland's apprehensions were concerned, two developments in particular heightened awareness of Russia's threat: the Georgian-Russian War of 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. In light of these events, Polish decision makers began to articulate, unequivocally, the fear of Russian revisionism, by pointing out Russia's attempts to change the international order, Russia's corresponding efforts to rebuild its traditional sphere of influence in neighbouring countries (including Poland), and, subsequently, Russia's renewed drive to modernize its military. Polish President Lech Kaczyński expressed this view candidly at a rally in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi on 12 August 2008. Standing amongst four presidents of the former Soviet republics—Victor Yushchenko of Ukraine, Toomas Hendrik of Estonia, Ivars Godmanis of Latvia, and Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania—he addressed an applauding crowd of thousands with words that left no doubt as to the source of the region's instability and violence:

3. Amélie Zima, "La Russie vue de Pologne : entre crainte, concurrence et poids de l'histoire," *Revue Défense Nationale*, n° 802, summer 2017, p. 1-6.

We are here, the leaders of five states: Poland, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. We are here in order to take up a struggle. For the first time in a long while, our neighbours from the north, in our case also from the north and from the east, have shown a face we have known for centuries. Those neighbours think that the nations around them should be subordinated to them. [...] That country is Russia. [...] That country thinks that the old times of an empire that collapsed 20 years ago are returning; that domination will once again be the chief trait of this region. It won't! [...] We also know very well that today it's Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the Baltic States, and after that it will perhaps be time for my country, Poland! [...] But we are able to stand up against it [...].⁴

Anxieties about Russia's revisionist policy grew further following the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine and Russia's annexation of Crimea. In November 2014, the view that Russia posed a principal threat to Poland was formally expressed for the first time since the end of the Cold War in the official state document, *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*. Less than a year later, in September 2015, the Polish Minister of National Defence, Tomasz Siemoniak, bluntly pointed the finger at the Kremlin:

Since the end of the Cold War, our assessment of the security situation in Europe has been free of illusions about the absence of threats of a military nature. The events in Ukraine only increased our perception of such threats. They confirmed the unpredictability of Russian policy, aimed at regaining the status of a superpower and achieving arbitrarily defined political objectives, also through the use of military means.⁵

The public concurred. Although during the thirteen years following the collapse of the Soviet Union the majority of Poles did not see Russia as a threat to Poland's independence, this perception changed drastically after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis. One month after Russia

4. Excerpt from a speech delivered by Polish President Lech Kaczyński's during a rally in Georgia in August 2008, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ojcme45iykc> (Accessed on 16 December 2017 [Author's own translation]).

5. *Główne kierunki rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych RP wobec nowych uwarunkowań bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego* Wystąpienie wicepremiera, ministra obrony narodowej Tomasza Siemoniaka z okazji 60-lecia Zgromadzenia Parlamentarnego NATO, 22 September 2015, http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/rozne/2015/09/Warszawa_22.09.2015.pdf (Accessed on 20 February 2016 [Author's own translation]).

annexed the Crimea in March 2014, 47% of respondents believed that there was a real threat to Poland's independence.⁶

The growing sense of a Russian threat has led Poland to intensify measures aimed at strengthening its defence capabilities. Following the Georgian-Russian War and the annexation of the Crimea, Poland adopted a three-pronged approach to ensuring its security: strengthening and consolidating NATO (including the reinforcement of the eastern flank of NATO); maintaining a strategic partnership with the US; and strengthening Poland's own resources and military capabilities. The necessity to cooperate within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU (CSDP) was also underscored. The *Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021* specifies that Poland's security requires simultaneous measures in three complementary areas:

1. Allied: enhancing NATO credibility, boosting the EU's potential, and maintaining close ties with the United States,
2. Regional: closer cooperation with countries in the region, especially Romania, the Visegrad Group and the Baltic and Nordic states; and the adoption of a proactive Eastern policy and
3. Domestic: significantly bolstering Poland's own defence capabilities.⁷

In practice, strengthening and consolidating NATO, together with reinforcing the eastern flank of NATO and maintaining the strategic partnership with the USA, are the most important instruments in guaranteeing Poland's security.⁸

NON-MILITARY SECURITY THREATS AND CHALLENGES IN THE BACKGROUND

Threats of a non-military nature are not among the leading causes of concern for Polish decision makers. On the one hand, the *Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021* acknowledges that Europe is threatened by religious radicalism, especially Islamic fundamentalism bent on des-

6. *Opinions about national security*, CBOS, 17 April 2014.

7. *Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021*, *op. cit.*

8. See more: Justyna Zając, *Poland's Security Policy. The West, Russia, and the Changing International Order*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

troying European civilization through terror. Similarly, the document states that terrorism and uncontrolled migration flows constitute a genuine challenge to transatlantic security. On the other hand, these phenomena do not occupy centre stage compared to other threats and challenges to Polish security. Poland has not experienced the consequences of terrorism or the European migrant crisis as intensely or directly as many other European countries. Polish society remains highly homogenous, and—as luck would have it—it has not yet been the target of a terrorist attack. Although Poles were among the victims of terrorist attacks abroad, Polish territory has been spared by terrorist attacks. Moreover, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2017, Poland is one of the safest countries in the world in terms of terrorist threats. Unsurprisingly, Polish society does not view terrorism as the most important threat to Poland's security. According to public opinion surveys, the percentage of Poles who believed that terrorist attacks could happen in their country decreased from 46% in September 2015 to 29% in November 2017. The proportion of respondents who declared that they were not afraid of a terrorist attack increased from 29% to 67% in the same period.⁹

Illegal immigration is another matter entirely. Ever since the Law and Justice Party (PiS) came to power in October 2015, Poland—in defiance of prior European Union accords—has refused to accept refugees coming from Africa and the Middle East. In September 2015, EU foreign ministers reached an agreement according to which Poland was expected to admit approximately 7,000 refugees who had arrived in Europe from the EU's southern neighbourhood in the previous months. Once the new PiS-led government was constituted in November 2015, Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło announced that Poland would not take in any of the refugees it had agreed to accept in its negotiations with the EU. In April 2016, the Polish parliament (Sejm) adopted a resolution on Poland's migration policy that denounced the decision of the Council of the European Union of 22 September 2015 to relocate 120,000 refugees within EU Member States. The resolution was pointedly critical of Poland's previous government and it conveyed strong opposition to any attempt to establish permanent mechanisms

9. Zuzanna Dąbrowska, "Sondaż: Zamachy Polakom już nie straszne," *Rzeczypolita*, 6 November 2017.

for allocating refugees or immigrants. The document states that instruments of refugee and immigration policies should remain in the hands of the Polish state.¹⁰

The public, again, has been supportive of the government and its policies toward refugees. Based on surveys, Poles have been unfailingly sceptical about the relocation of refugees arriving in the EU from the Middle East and Africa. According to the December 2016 polls, the vast majority of respondents (67%) were opposed to accepting refugees from Muslim countries in Poland.¹¹ The majority of Poles view the influx of immigrants from Muslim countries as an overt threat to Polish identity, in particular, and European civilization, in general. The attitude of hostility toward refugees from Africa and the Middle East seems to arise from the fact that the migrants come from countries where Islam is the dominant religion. The hostile attitude toward migrants from Muslim-majority countries does not extend, for example, to immigrants from Christian Ukraine. Invariably, more than half of respondents (58%) believe that Poland should accept refugees from Ukraine, especially in areas that are destabilized by conflict, whereas 37% of respondents are against this solution.¹²

Poland's anti-migrant posture prompted the European Commission to refer Poland (along with two other Visegrad Group members—Hungary and the Czech Republic) in December 2017 to the Court of Justice of the EU for non-compliance with its legal obligations on refugee relocation. As the Commission opined:

Whereas all other Member States have relocated and pledged in the past months, Hungary has not taken any action at all since the relocation scheme started, Poland has not relocated anyone and not pledged since December 2015. The Czech Republic has not relocated anyone since August 2016 and not made any new pledges for over a year.¹³

10. "Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 1 kwietnia 2016 r. w sprawie polityki imigracyjnej Polski," *Monitor Polski. Dziennik Urzędowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 13 April 2016, p. 370.

11. *Stosunek Polaków do przyjmowania uchodźców*, Komunikat z Badań, CBOS, 1/2017, p. 3.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Relocation: Commission refers the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Court of Justice*, European Commission—Press Release, Brussels, 7 December 2017. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5002_en.htm.

To ease the conflict, at the EU summit in Brussels in December 2017, all four Visegrad Group countries agreed to pledge 35 million euros to the Italian-led project of boosting security and border controls in Libya as part of EU efforts to curtail the flow of people attempting the perilous journey from North Africa to Europe. The Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni welcomed the financial contribution but reminded the Visegrad Group members of their obligation to accept refugees, thus signalling that the relocation of quotas is the “minimum wage” for the EU.¹⁴

EU warnings and reminders are likely to fall on deaf ears as Poland has unremittingly rejected the relocation system, declaring, in response, to provide on-the-spot assistance to civilians affected by the conflict.

The so-called Islamic State poses both an external and internal challenge to the EU: by destabilizing the European neighbourhood, but also by undermining Europe’s political and social order by embracing terrorist attacks. This has been accompanied by a vast wave of immigration that has caused deep divisions among EU Member States, shaking the very foundations of the European project. However, as the strategy underlines, ‘we must bear in mind that the diverse challenges originating from the South and from the East each requires a tailored response’.¹⁵

CONCLUSION

Poland conventionally views threats to its security in political and military terms because of contemporary international developments and its geopolitical location and historical experience. Poland is located between two European powers, Germany and Russia. The centuries-old history of relations with both has been saturated with conflicts and wars. From the end of the 18th century, Poland has been on the receiving end of these conflicts. In consequence, in 1795, Poland vanished from the map of Europe for 123 years, with its historic lands divided between Prussia, Russia and Austria. In the last hundred years

14. Nikolaj Nielsen, Caterina Tani, “Slovak PM: Human Rights are not a travel pass to EU,” *EU Observer*, 14 December 2017 (<https://euobserver.com/migration/140291>).

15. *Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021*, *op. cit.*, p. 3-6.

(1918–2018), Poland has enjoyed independence, but its history has been turbulent.

After the end of the Cold War, a multifaceted cooperation with Germany allowed Poland to largely overcome its historical fear of its western neighbour. The same cannot be said of Russia. In the post-Cold War era, sustainable normalizing of Polish-Russian relations has proved impossible. Moreover, Poland’s concerns about the Russian threat have been growing in the last ten years. The policies of the current government, led by the nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS), express this fear very clearly. The government continues to maintain that international politics have reverted to rivalries between states that strive to expand and maintain their own spheres of influence. Likewise, the government maintains, world politics have been characterized by hierarchical alignment among states, the rise of imperial ambitions of some states, and the use of power to pressure weaker states. Taking everything into account, in the view of PiS, the geopolitics of the 19th century is the dominant backdrop of international politics of the 21st century. This perspective shapes the types of instruments used by the government in formulating its security policy, which puts a premium on military force and cooperation between countries that share common interests.

Attachment to traditional social values, with the Christian religion as the foundation of European civilization, also fuels the reluctance of the PiS-led government to accept refugees and illegal immigrants from predominantly Muslim states. The government recognizes that terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and the tide of illegal immigration from the South presents a challenge to European security. Yet, such threats are at the bottom of the list of threats to Poland’s security. Russia’s policy and the destabilization of the situation in Eastern Europe remain the government’s top priorities.

INSTABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY. STRATEGIC REVIEW OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE CHALLENGES FROM A FRENCH PERSPECTIVE

Édouard JOLLY and Colonel Olivier PASSOT

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ABSTRACT

Édouard Jolly and Colonel Olivier Passot provide a framework for the French strategic understanding of the recent security threats and the most important challenges for France and EU members in the years to come. They underline different questions raised by the evolution of an unstable strategic environment combined with active sources of uncertainty. What are the types of challenges France has to face? How will it be possible to maintain and develop the strategic autonomy of the French armed forces, taking into account the international balance of power? Although Islamic extremism remains a latent political issue for France, this should not distract from other challenging issues of the coming decades.

INTRODUCTION

As shown in the last *Strategic Review of Defence and National security*,¹ Jihadism remains the most effective mobilizing ideology for terrorist attacks on European soil. This latent destabilizing factor may lead potentially to increasingly vulnerable democratic States, while expanding to new regions of the world, which are already affected by insurgency and civil war. Addressing this threat both on the political and military levels will thus continue to be an area of focus for European countries. However, once minimum stability is re-established in the Middle East, the terrorism threat will not disappear. French defence will still have to confront this threat and the risk of its combination with other major threats. According to the findings of the 2017 Pew Research Center survey of European populations, the other leading security threats are global climate change, economic instability, cyberattacks from other countries, increasing numbers of refugees, tensions with Russia and, to some extent, the emergence of China as a world power.² The general purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of these security and defence challenges from a French perspective in the context of the European Union. Although, for the moment, a unified command structure that might replace the individual structures of each nation-state still seems far from being achieved, progress on security and defence integration is underway. The enhancement of EU defence has been recognized by the 28 leaders of European states and governments for the first time, in June 2016, as part of a global strategy for a common defence and security autonomy. In order to better understand the different types of challenges that France and the EU will be likely to face in the next years, their characterization will be carried out in two steps, by first listing the factors of political instability, and then prioritizing the sources of uncertainty. The conclusion will then present the different key points for a strategic autonomy from a French perspective.

1. *Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale*, La Documentation Française, 2017, p. 37.

2. See Pew Research Center, August 2017, [“Globally, People Point to ISIS and Climate Change as Leading Security Threats”](#) (Accessed on 30 January 2018).

AN UNSTABLE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

National Territory and Islamic Terrorism

Islamic terrorism is experiencing a phase of transformation that will not diminish either the scope or the danger of the decade to come: even if major jihadist organizations seem about to retreat from theatres of operation, the political ideology that underlies them will probably not weaken. Since the attacks on the RER B in 1995, France is regularly the target of terrorist acts, mostly with jihadist motives. Confronting a succession of this kind of attack,³ France needs to adapt its response. Since 2015, numerous terrorist attacks have happened in Europe, some of which appear to have been planned by international terrorist organizations (Al-Qaeda, Daesh), but many of which appear to be “lone-wolf” attacks. While terrorism is not a new phenomenon either in Europe or in France, the methods of the most recent round of attacks are hard to prevent: six of the seven most recent terrorist incidents causing fatalities in Europe have involved attackers using cars or trucks to drive into pedestrians.⁴ Terrorists use violent modes of action (attacks, hostage-taking, assassinations) and publicise them in order to strike public opinion and create or maintain a climate of fear. The political purpose is to destabilize a state and establish a political context conducive to guerrilla warfare. These attacks may target a specific location, such as train stations, airports, institutions, shopping centres, theatres or amusement parks.⁵ It may also target a particular individual, either because of what he or she embodies or because his or her removal may influence the course of political life. The threat from Islamic terrorism may remain a major challenge for French and some European policymakers. This implies searching for adequate ways of responding to currently known threats and other means of attack, like the use of civil infrastructure and “low cost” levelling capacities.

3. As a reminder: the deadly assault of Mohammed Merah in 2012, the *Charlie Hebdo* attack in January 2015, beheading in Isere in June 2015, Bataclan attack in November 2015, the assassination of police officers in June 2016 and the attack in Nice on July 14, 2016.

4. EPRS – Global Trends Unit, *Global Trends to 2035 – Geo-politics and international power*, Brussels, 2017, p. 14.

5. For example: Madrid bombing in 2004, London in 2005, Nairobi in 2013, Paris in 2015, Brussels in 2016, Berlin in 2016, Lahore in 2016.

Political Tensions in European Union

After Brexit, France, a founding member of the EU and NATO, will be the only European country acting as permanent member of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council), with a complete armed forces model, but also the only nuclear power. The process of the United Kingdom leaving the EU is underway, with little indication from London or Brussels on the nature of the post-Brexit relationship. This creates a wide range of possible outcomes, ranging from a weakened UK, which has suffered a major depression and seen Scotland and Northern Ireland leave the country, to a country that has proceeded largely along pre-Brexit economic projections, or even to a reversal of Brexit or the reapplication of the UK to join the EU. France will in any case have to maintain a dual ambition: preserve its strategic autonomy and build a stronger Europe, to cope with increasing common challenges.

The drive for Catalan independence also captured the world's attention in October 2017, when a banned referendum on the issue was met with a heavy police crackdown. Catalonia is one of Spain's wealthiest and most productive regions. The region has its own language and distinctive traditions, and a population nearly as big as Switzerland's. This regionalist claim seems close to other ones in the EU, such as, for example, Flanders in Belgium or to some extent Corsica with France. The regional current is running strong in most parts of the EU, conspicuously in northern Italy, without forgetting Basque Country. In the framework of multilevel governance, European integration has legitimized the regions as interlocutors of the EU. Hence regions can have direct access to the EU market and funding. This has nourished some independentist claims, despite the fact that they are not legally admissible. Smaller states within the EU seem more viable and more politically attractive, by diminishing the relative economic and political advantages of larger-sized states. While being regularly under criticism, EU governance will have to take into account that the benefits of European economic integration come with the challenge of an increased regionalist mobilization that has the potential to reshape the national boundaries on the continent.

Nuclear Deterrence and Conventional Forces in Eastern Europe.

The possibility of nuclear war in Europe has resurfaced under Putin's regime in Russia. As part of Moscow's "escalation to de-escalate" concept, Russia's large-scale exercises incorporate the scenarios of a limited nuclear strike against NATO. Russia has launched a large-scale modernization program and is expanding the range of (so far) tactical delivery systems. Moscow's political discourse still includes a nuclear threat to the West. NATO's range of response options to such threats and limited nuclear war scenarios has diminished. Because of Russia's regional superiority in conventional forces and its anti-access capabilities, the Baltic area appears particularly vulnerable.

Despite the deployment of Enhanced Forward Presence units to the eastern flank members, NATO still relies on deterrence by punishment to prevent the possibility of a Russian military attack in the area. But Russia's posture and capabilities could allow it to seize the Baltic States, establishing a relatively quick victory that it then would defend by issuing nuclear threats. Moreover, Russia recently deployed the Iskander in Kaliningrad, a mobile ballistic missile system codenamed SS-26 Stone by NATO, replacing the Soviet Scud missile. Its two guided missiles have a range of up to 500 kilometres and can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.⁶ Lithuania claims that the deployment of the nuclear-capable Iskander system has been made permanent, which would mean that a direct nuclear threat concerns half of the states of the EU. To prevent Russian miscalculation of the alliance's determination, NATO needs to enhance credible conventional deterrence in the Baltic area, making it impossible for Russia to seize any of these countries quickly.⁷ In this framework, France has to take responsibility for its nuclear deterrence. Its defensive weapon could be used under exceptional circumstances of self-defence as recognized by the UN charter.

6. "Russia deploys Iskander nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad: RIA," Reuters, 5 February 2018.

7. Jüri Luik and Tomas Jermalavičius, "A plausible scenario of nuclear war in Europe, and how to deter it: A perspective from Estonia," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 73:4, 2017, p. 233-239.

Armed Conflicts: Areas of Effective Destabilization

Several areas of open crisis deserve special attention, because of the risks they pose to the interests of France and of the enduring commitment of its armed forces. Simultaneous operational activities entail the risk of overstretching and put our capacities under stress. While participating in NATO manoeuvres in the Baltic, French forces are deployed both in the Sahel region under national command and in the Middle East in an international coalition, in addition to other commitments (several bases in Africa, in the Pacific Ocean and in the Indian Ocean). As a source of priority issues for France in the fight against terrorism, as well as the protection of expatriate communities, the Sahelo-Saharan area runs the risk of seeing jihadist movements take root. Taking advantage of the weaknesses in the areas of governance, security and development, these movements are adapting and recomposing themselves, aggravating the structural imbalances and fragilities of the states, while threatening the neighbouring areas both to the north (Maghreb) and south (sub-Saharan Africa). These developments are apparent in Mali, with the official establishment of Daesh in 2016 and the rapprochement of the different Islamic movements. French forces are also engaged against Daesh in the Levant (*Chammal*) with land, air and naval forces, and they have been operating in Lebanon under UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) since its establishment. They maintain a significant presence with permanent facilities in the United Arab Emirates and Djibouti and permanent deployments in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

In the Levant, the successive military defeats of Daesh initiate a phase of complex transition, which will remain dominated in Syria and Iraq by community fractures, the game of regional powers, the management of refugees and the evolution of Russian-American relations. The period ahead may be particularly difficult to manage for the Lebanese authorities, faced with Hezbollah and the problem of the return of refugees, which is an essential question for the demographic and political balance of the country. It could also affect neighbouring Jordan, which is militarily engaged in the conflict and exposed to the same challenge. The situation of the Kurds after their fight against Daesh remains a pending issue for the political balance of the region.

MUTUAL EVOLVING SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY

The sources of destabilization described above must be put into perspective with five factors of uncertainty potentially generating a greater risk of conflict. Climate change, WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) proliferation (including CBRNE threats)⁸, demographic pressure, massive migrations and hybrid conflicts fuelled by international crime are factors contributing to increasing uncertainty and to spreading fear among the populations of the EU. The *Strategic Review of Defence and National Security* takes heed of the possible frailty of French defence if no decision is reached within the next years regarding the evolution of these particular security challenges.⁹

Climate Change

Changes in the global climate due to rising greenhouse gases will not be reversed in the coming decades, even if great efforts are made with the implementation of political agreements to reduce carbon usage in the future. As the consequences of climate change become increasingly apparent, France is likely to see climate-related political disputes multiply at the national and international level. DROMs and COMs (tiers of regional and local government in the French overseas territories) present a particular and recurrent vulnerability to these risks. Although a drought is unlikely to directly cause civil war, climate change will affect human security in a broader sense. Drought and other climatic shocks frequently cause dismay and poverty, and more extreme weather in the years to come suggests more human suffering. The key question in this regard is to determine how rapid environmental change can affect social relations and local land use disputes.¹⁰ The confluence of urbanization and climate change will drive increased losses from meteorological hazards such as flash floods and coastal flooding, tropical storms and landslides. Southern Europe will be seve-

8. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive threats.

9. See in particular: *Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale*, *op. cit.*, p. 30-33 and 54-56.

10. Ole Magnus Theisen, Helge Holtermann and Halvard Buhaug, "Climate Wars? Assessing the Claim That Drought Breeds Conflict," *International Security*, 36:3, p. 79-106.

rely hit by prolonged heat waves, causing increased water scarcity, decreased agricultural productivity, coastal flooding, and loss of biodiversity. Northern Europe will struggle mostly with coastal and river flooding.¹¹ In such circumstances, it appears necessary to redefine the role of the state in finding political solutions. Global warming may also increase migration movements. The pressure generated by extreme weather events on the availability of critical resources is likely to increase international and local competition for their control. Climate change may have a large-scale impact and will need to be addressed by a high level of political resolve. International cooperation has to be developed for prevention and assistance.

Proliferation: Conventional Armament, Hybridization and WMD

Regarding the question of armaments, non-state actors such as terrorist movements have long benefited from the abundant spread of weapons resulting from trafficking as well as from the looting of former arsenals. The proliferation of weapons from Qaddafi stockpiles fuelled the 2012 Islamist insurgencies in Mali. Then armed actors operating throughout the Sahel region were able to acquire weapon systems. This phenomenon also extends to the latest-generation tactical weapons as well as heavy weapons, such as MAN PADS (man-portable air defence systems). Illicit weapons flows indicate that the Islamist groups responsible for the Sahelian attacks have a common source of supply. There is also evidence of commonalities of supply sources between Islamist fighters in West Africa and those operating in Iraq and Syria.¹² This confirms the hybridization of contemporary armed conflicts because of the porosity between terrorist and criminal activities, which has worsened with the development of transnational jihadist organizations. They share identical practices and expertise with organized crime networks (such as clandestinity and money laundering) or even occasionally exploit the same channels. Weapons from

11. Arno Behrens, Anton Georgiev and Melis Carraro, ["Future Impacts of Climate Change across Europe: CEPS Working Document No. 324,"](#) Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2010.

12. Conflict Armament Research, *Investigating Cross-Border Weapon Transfers in the Sahel*, 2016.

the Western Balkans were used in the Paris attacks of November 2015. Some states, such as North Korea, feed or even become directly involved in the development of these criminal activities, in order to circumvent sanctions or to find sources of financing. "Today's combat forces are increasingly faced with global, varied and ever-changing threats. The operations in Libya, Iraq and Mali illustrate how dissymmetric conflict is veering into asymmetric or hybrid threats, which are ultimately more complex to tackle over the long-term with modern inter-army forces abiding by the laws of warfare."¹³ However, the legal possibilities of supplying materials should not be underestimated: Regarding Daesh chains of supply for their IEDs (Improvised Explosive Device), the acquisition networks drew mostly on lawful commerce in the countries that bordered their territory.¹⁴ IED components are commercial goods that are not subject to government export licenses and whose transfer is far less controlled and regulated than the transfer of weapons. One should also not forget that chemical arsenals and the necessary expertise for their use are still a tangible reality. The use of chemical agents on the national territory is a hypothesis, which cannot be excluded.

Actors like North Korea also contribute to making an international policy of nuclear deterrence more uncertain. North Korea is developing both a political discourse and military capabilities that aim to bring about disruption between Washington and its allies in Asia. The North Korean crisis is also a problem of proliferation, which is coupled with a question of deterrence and defence, threatening not only regional stability but also the dynamics of non-proliferation and the related international security. Some states with nuclear capabilities have opted for opaque postures, breaking with the classic codes of deterrence in favour of aggressive nuclear posturing, including a dimension of blackmail and the potential offensive use of nuclear weapons. Although the United States still remains the leader in military matters, its share of

13. Antoine Windeck (Major General), "Introductory Letter," in *Réflexions tactiques*, Special Issue: "Taking on New Forms of Conflict, New Challenges for Land Forces," 2016, p. 3.

14. Conflict Armament Research, *Tracing the Supply of Components used in Islamic State IEDs*, London, 2016.

global defence expenditure decreased since 2010.¹⁵ At the same time, China and Russia are not only present across the spectrum and have greater capacities than European countries but are also engaged in a policy of capacity modernization and technological catch-up. France is thus confronted with a persistent military multipolarity, with the risk of being the only nuclear state in the EU and therefore having to assume this responsibility in the case of a reduced US commitment in Europe. France must continue to adapt to this new reality, in particular by strengthening its diplomatic tools fostered with a public nuclear deterrence policy.

Demographic Pressure and Massive Migration Crisis

Despite a downward trend, the world's population continues to grow. According to projections made by the UN, it will reach 8.6 billion in 2030, then 9.8 billion in 2050. Africa in particular is experiencing very strong growth, which defies the traditional model of demographic transition: with nearly 1.7 billion people in 2030, the African continent is expected to account for more than half of global population growth, reaching 2.4 billion people by 2050. Recent conflicts have led to significant displacement of populations. The EU has been faced with the irregular influx of millions of people, with a peak of nearly 1.9 million people in 2015, including 1.2 million asylum seekers. The influx of migrants and refugees in Europe, as well as the exponential increase in the population in less developed countries having weak infrastructure, represents a major challenge. These population movements can exacerbate already existing political and social tensions, particularly in the most economically vulnerable countries.

The UNHCR (The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), also estimates that on average 21.5 million people are already displaced by climate-related disasters every year. The highest total numbers of displaced persons have come after disasters in India and Myanmar, while the highest number of displaced persons as a percentage of the country's population has been in the Pacific Island nations.

15. On world military expenditure, see: Nan Tian, Aude Fleurant, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, *Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016*, SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2017.

Because climate change places strains on resources, it can lead to or trigger social upheavals and can indirectly result in armed conflicts and subsequent migratory flows. For example, the war in Syria has caused 13.5 million people to become displaced, 4.8 million of whom have left Syria. Among the drivers of the Syrian war was a series of droughts, and so this massive displacement can be considered, in part, climate-related. Europe will continue to be one of the main destinations of climate-related migration. It is close to the climate-insecure areas of North Africa, the Sahel, East Africa, and the Middle East, from which there already exist migration patterns.

Cyber-Threats: Strategic New Issues

In recent years, an increasing number of States have developed cyber capabilities and are allegedly conducting cyber-offensive operations. In that sense, it should be noted that several APTs (Advanced Persistent Threats) have reportedly been attributed to States. Cyber threats have already demonstrated particular success in several cases, from destroying nuclear centrifuges in Iran and cutting off information systems in Crimea in 2014, to interfering in electoral processes in the US and France in 2016 and 2017, and they will continue to increase in the future. The dual nature of cyberspace means that both military and civilian spheres are concerned by cyber threats. The more networked our objects are, the greater the risk that their use will be diverted from their original function. There are two major factors of uncertainty: first, espionage operations, even sabotage, and, second, the damage caused by viruses, especially when a state's exploits and malware are modified and reused by other actors, contributing to jeopardizing international peace and security, such as in the case of the Eternal Blue exploit developed by the NSA and reused by WannaCry and NotPetya. The dual dimension of the Internet, and its private-based structure, forces States to consider these issues in coordination with private sectors, and notably tech giants. As government-sponsored cyber units experiment with operational concepts and doctrine, new forms of threats will emerge, and mission objectives are likely to shift from espionage to more diverse cyber operations. In the near future, we can expect that the threat of altering medical records, accessing

government personnel files, and targeting low-level bureaucrats for blackmail may become common. The increasing exposure of European societies to digitization increases their vulnerability. The use of cybernetic tools can cause significant industrial damage and reach critical networks or infrastructure. The difficulty of controlling the spread of attacks, their vectors and their consequences also involves major systemic risks. Actions in cyberspace produce global effects with limited resources. In the military field, the increasing dependence of weapons or command systems on digital technologies makes them increasingly vulnerable to this threat.

KEY POINTS FOR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

This brief overview leads us to confirm that French armed forces will have to cover the whole spectrum of military capabilities, as France intends to play a global role in favour of peace on the international scene. To match this ambition, the five strategic functions defined by the 2013 Defence *White Paper* remain relevant. *Nuclear deterrence* remains an essential pillar of the French defence strategy.¹⁶ It is protecting France and by extension the EU against any aggression of state origin. It preserves freedom of action and decision by removing any threat of symmetrical armed conflict. The French nuclear deterrent thus remains strictly defensive: the use of nuclear weapons would be conceivable only in extreme circumstances of self defence against the powers that, even with a larger nuclear arsenal, could not pursue an aggression whose ultimate conclusion would be MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction). At the request of the President of the Republic, the *protection contract* is maintained at the same level, but the employment doctrine and the modes of action have been adapted to facilitate the engagement of the military and to integrate the exceptionality of the state of emergency within the rule of law, under the responsibility of the civilian authority. Operation *Sentinelle* is the commitment of armed forces in support of police and gendarmerie to increase the protection of the French people and the security of sensitive sites. In the event of a CBRNE issue on the national territory, specific capabilities of the armed forces would also be used. Knowledge and

16. See: [Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale 2013](#).

anticipation have been introduced in the 2008 Defence *White Paper*. This strategic function remains a high priority, aiming to preserve our autonomy to assess and decide whether to act or not and to adapt the response level. The existence of university research centres in collaboration with defence institutions contributes to this knowledge capacity. The *intervention* capabilities contribute directly to defending national interests, protecting French citizens abroad, honouring France's obligations and supporting the international community.

As crystallized by the cyber-threat, *prevention* requires close coordination between military action, diplomacy, the action of intelligence services and the mobilization of human and financial capacities of ministries other than those in charge of defence and foreign affairs. To comply with the five strategic functions, operational contracts have been assigned to the armed forces. These contracts determine the capabilities, equipment and personnel necessary. In other words, they define the model for the French armed forces adapted to current challenges and threats. This model is still being adapted, on the basis of the Strategic Review and of the Military Programming Law (2019–2025), which will lead to raising the defence effort to 2% of GDP by 2025.

NATO AND TRANSATLANTIC LINKS: MAIN DETERMINANTS AND KEY CHALLENGES

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ABSTRACT

It is often said that NATO is always in crisis. In a sense, this is understandable, since NATO is an alliance of democracies, and, among democracies, disputes and differences of opinion, even those leading to tensions, are quite normal. However, there is obviously the question of intensity—even if allies are always differing on some issues, such as their tasks, rules and the means at their disposal, such disputes are not equally serious and divisions not equally deep. Unfortunately, in recent years, these internal tensions—somewhat “natural” for NATO—seem to have grown. There is also a growing risk that the situation could worsen in the future. Unfortunately, at the same time, external challenges are also increasing in significance and urgency. In other words, the current crisis of cooperation in NATO may be somewhat more profound than usual, both because of its specificity, as well as due to changes in the Alliance’s strategic environment.

TWO MAIN DETERMINANTS

US Leadership—Unpredictable and Transactional

The key determinant for the functioning of the Alliance, something that has most influenced intra-Alliance relations, is the nature of the US leadership after the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. Obviously, the US role in the Alliance has been pivotal since the very beginning. Currently, however, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the position of the US president on NATO is rather critical or negative. During his campaign, Donald Trump repeatedly called NATO obsolete, militarily and politically useless, and “unfair” to the US and its citizens (or rather taxpayers), who in his view were exploited and abused by allies and had to pay too much for the security of Europeans.¹ Fortunately, after taking power, President Trump has somewhat changed his rhetoric and withdrawn his harshest criticism about U.S. allies, presenting a more moderate view of NATO. However, even during the NATO mini-summit in Brussels in May 2017, which was his first occasion to meet personally with all Alliance leaders, Trump focused on criticizing the allies for “underspending” and avoided a clear declaration of support for the collective defence clause (article 5) in the Washington Treaty. This meeting deepened the worries of (most) European partners about NATO’s cohesion and their doubts concerning American determination for engagement.² Some positive gestures by President Trump after the Brussels visit (like mentioning the collective defence pledge in his speech in Warsaw in July) did not dispel all of the allies’ concerns, in particular, because they were accompanied by regular reminders about the need for Europeans to pay their “fair share” of NATO costs.

The main sources of these uncertainties are President Trump’s somewhat egocentric personality, rather limited experience and knowledge of the practice of public and international affairs, distrust of the political and diplomatic establishment in Washington and “business progeny”. In other words, President Trumps’ mindset seems to be still

1. Michael Gove, Kai Diekmann, “[Full transcript of interview with Donald Trump](#),” *The Times*, 16 January 2017.

2. Steven Erlanger *et al.*, “[In Brussels, Trump Scolds Allies on Cost-Sharing and Stays Vague on Article 5](#),” *The New York Times*, 25 May 2017.

more of a once successful, sometimes innovative businessman than of a politician and statesman, who “plays by the books of diplomacy and politics.” That peculiarity adds two new characteristics to US policy on NATO (as well as to other foreign policy issues): a unique level of unpredictability matched with disregard for the interdependencies and complexities of relations between allies and between states in the world as a whole, as well as a strongly transactional approach towards alliances, reduced to a focus on the level of financial spending, viewed almost entirely through the prism of the impact on the US budget.

Under such circumstances, the role of the President’s advisors and the whole administration may be crucial. However, criticism of European countries as “usual free riders” in NATO did not emerge with the election of Trump, and indeed his views on this matter are shared by a substantial number of US officials, even if these views are usually not presented in such a radical, brutal way.³ Secondly, the current administration has struggled with substantial deficiencies. Despite the availability and excellence of security experts and diplomats in the US, the current administration evidently lacks qualified and experienced personnel. The State Department is particularly understaffed as many experienced officials decided to resign (or were asked to resign) and several posts are still vacant.⁴ In addition, the administration is also plagued by frequent personnel changes, even among the advisors closest to the President (The reasons for these changes are important to note, as most of them were the result of personal conflicts with the President). Lastly, the ongoing Russia-gate, the alleged illegal and clandestine support of the Russian government for Donald Trump during his presidential campaign, also complicates cooperation within NATO, both because of the impact on US internal politics and foreign activities (potentially threatening the very survival of the current admini-

3. One should remember the “[farewell speech](#)” of Robert Gates, Secretary of Defence during the first Obama administration, in Brussels on June 7 2011, in which he warned the allies—although in a much more empathic way than Trump—about the consequences of the imbalance in burden sharing between the two Atlantic coasts for future cooperation within NATO.

4. Elise Labott, “[Trump administration asks top State Department officials to leave](#),” *CNN*, 27 January 2017. For example, there is still no nominee for such posts as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-military Affairs (the main liaison point for Department of Defence) or Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operation. See: “[The Washington Post Trump Administration Appointee Tracker](#).”

nistration) and due to the negative impact on American leadership credibility in the world and among allies, who are ever more suspicious of Russian intentions.

In addition, US attention has slowly, rather inadvertently, begun shifting toward Asia, not only due to the escalation of crises, such as the one on the Korean Peninsula, but also because of long-term global power shifts. Washington's approach to NATO and Europe as a whole will have to be "less strategic" than before, no longer stimulated by a comprehensive vision of its relations with European allies or designed to set the agenda and shape of the environment.

Europe — The Challenge of Populism

Although US primacy in NATO is unquestionable, irrespective of the condition and the character of the administration in Washington, under the current circumstances, European members could step in to play a more constructive and independent role in shaping NATO's future. However, on the European side of the Atlantic, there are also several factors that limit European capability (or the capability of particular states) to take an initiative in NATO. Their main problem is a largely European phenomenon—the rise of political parties and movements that can be broadly understood as populist. Although the global economic crisis of 2008 has been largely overcome, and the more recent migration crisis has lost much of its impetus, the general trend in political life in Europe, which is marked by radical, anti-establishment and sometimes nationalist and xenophobic political parties or movements, is still strong. As a result, in some NATO countries, such radical movements have strengthened their power (Hungary and Turkey), seized power (Poland) or started to participate in government (for example in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania), while in other states, their political position, formerly marginalized, has started to grow substantially (far right in France and Holland, radicals from both sides of the political spectrum in Italy or the anti-immigration AfD in Germany). Moreover, their presence and popularity mean that even moderates adapt their programs to accommodate the more radical views of the public. The results are growing intra-European tensions over values once thought to be commonly accepted and recognized, such as the rule of law and liberal democracy,

as well as over various economic issues.⁵ Even if these tensions are manifest primarily within the European Union, they inadvertently have an impact on relations between European states and also on NATO, limiting particularly the level of trust among allies. Moreover, for various reasons, all the biggest European NATO members—the natural leaders of Europe, like France, Germany or the United Kingdom—are currently less ready to assume leading roles. France, under its new, energetic president Macron, prefers to act through the structures of the EU in matters related to security (defence), which could cause some unease among the more pro-American and Transatlantist allies. Germany is still awaiting its new government (and the confirmation of its chancellor) after the parliamentary election in the fall. Merkel is no longer as strong as she was in the previous decade. Moreover, Germany's military potential is definitely not as impressive as its economic potential, and constitutional and political restrictions on German defence policy also limit their capability to spur new initiatives. The UK after the Brexit referendum lost a lot of its influence in Europe, even if the impact was less within the context of NATO. Countries like Spain and Italy are also strongly preoccupied with internal affairs. In addition, NATO has to cope with the authoritarian tendencies in Turkey under President Erdoğan, who is more and more independent from Brussels (and in fact often on a collision course) in his decisions concerning relations with the wider world, including Russia and Middle Eastern states. All of this means that it is still a big challenge for Europeans to find the necessary consensus to show more initiative in NATO without waiting for the US opinion.

5. Seemingly the most important are disputes over recent changes in the Polish legal system regarding the Constitutional Tribunal, Supreme Court and ordinary courts, which ultimately led to the initiation of the so-called Infringement procedure against Poland to the European Court of Justice by the European Commission. "[Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in Poland](#)," EC Press Release, Brussels, 20 December 2017. Problems of similar nature also exist in the relations between the European institutions and Hungary. In the NATO framework the most extreme case of differences over values is a growing row between Turkey and the rest of allies—although, for now, it has not heavily influenced practical cooperation within the Alliance, repressions against Turkish opposition after the failed coup d'état in July 2016 gave rise to tensions between Turkey and some allies, particularly Germany, where several Turkish citizens were granted political asylum. Arthur Beesley, "Nato holds its peace as relations with Turkey degrade," *The Financial Times*, 26 June 2017.

THREE KEY CHALLENGES

Common Threat Assessment and Priorities of Tasks—How Sustainable is NATO 360°?

Probably the most general challenge that NATO members face currently is how to maintain cohesion on issues related to threat assessment and the definition of tasks. Since 2014 and the eruption of the conflict in Ukraine, NATO has decided to focus its activities on developing its readiness to deter threats to the so-called Eastern Flank by improving the capabilities necessary to defend itself and demonstrating its determination to do so if necessary. It was to some degree forced to do this in light of the seriousness of the threat to European stability posed by Russia and the seriousness of past Russian threats. This trend, established in Wales, was confirmed by the Warsaw 2016 summit decision on Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the East and tailored deterrence in the South East of the Alliance.⁶ However, challenges in other regions and of a different nature, like terrorism, WMD proliferation, state failure and regional instability (including mass migrations), remained. Moreover, for many allies, particularly from NATO's Southern Flank, these problems constituted an even more direct and immediate threat than did pressure from Russia, which is serious in terms of its consequences, but unlikely to lead to a direct confrontation.⁷ So, for the Alliance, an important task is to manage these substantial tensions between allies, caused by the multiplicity of threats and their diverse character: this means defining different

6. "[Warsaw Summit Communiqué](#)," North Atlantic Council, Warsaw, 9 July 2016 (point 40-41).

7. Poland recognizes threats from the South, particularly terrorism, as serious and requiring NATO response, as evidenced by Polish involvement in the coalition against ISIS (four F-16s in non-combat, reconnaissance roles and military trainers deployed respectively to Kuwait and Iraq). However, due to the diversity of these threats and their often non-traditional, sometimes even non-military nature, Poland sees them as requiring a comprehensive response. Hence, the role of NATO in countering them is more supplementary and should be part of wider international action, coordinated with other institutions, including the EU. NATO, as more appropriate to deal with traditional military threats, while active in responding to the challenges from the South, should focus instead on countering threats from the East, primarily posed by a resurgent Russia. See also: Piotr Łukaszewicz, "[NATO Summit in Warsaw – the Polish Perspective](#)," 6 July 2016.

requirements for successful responses, which is particularly relevant in the context of allies' limited resources. As a form of solution, the NATO 360o approach was officially confirmed at the Warsaw summit, meaning an agreement to accord similar and adequate attention to the threats, wherever their sources and whatever their manifestations. In practice, however, NATO has recently focused on strengthening the Eastern Flank, with seemingly wide support and acceptance among the allies, as evidenced by the relatively smooth implementation of the Enhanced Forward Presence.⁸ However, this consensus on priorities may turn out to be fragile. The Continuous instability in the Middle East and the Sahel, the worsening situation in Afghanistan, where NATO still has its largest expeditionary mission (and recently, in November 2017, decided to expand the mission from roughly 13,000 to 16,000 troops), the decline of ISIS and the risk of a new political vacuum in the region, growing tensions in the Far East—all of these factors could quickly lead to the emergence of new challenges or the resurgence of old ones outside of Europe. Moreover, even if such dramatic change does not take place, the Eastern members' common view of the Warsaw summit decisions on strengthening capabilities to counter relatively traditional military threats in the East is that they are just one step in a longer process which needs further improvement. These views are not necessarily shared by other allies, especially members from the South. They may treat the EFP and other measures initiated since 2014 as sufficient to satisfy the security needs of NATO (or at least the only possible measures in light of the current financial and international reality).

In addition, NATO has to deal with one additional challenge to its members' security. This challenge is rapidly growing and significantly different from almost every other challenge they have experienced in the past: the consequences of developments in cyberspace and global changes in communication caused by the growth and evolution of social media. Cyber security is no longer only about protecting critical infrastructure and information networks against hostile penetration. Now states have to deal with the misuse of global information networks (and of social media in particular), the creation of information chaos, the spread of "fake news" and the disruption of free public

8. As the main element of the EFP, four multinational battalions on high readiness were fully deployed to Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in June 2017.

discourse on political or social issues. Democracies seem to be particularly susceptible to such influence and unprepared to counter it. In addition, dealing effectively with such diverse and unique issues will be a major challenge for NATO, as a political-military alliance established almost 70 years ago and rather traditional in terms of its character and its methods of operation.

Defence Spending—The Fetish of 2%

Another question concerns changes in defence spending among NATO members. In 2014 in Wales, allies had promised that they would make a great effort to increase their defence spending to the level of 2% of GDP within a decade, with 20% of such expenditures devoted to the technical modernization of their militaries (a declaration often called the Defence Investment Pledge—DIP).⁹ Currently, the trends are generally positive—in 2016 in Warsaw, NATO leaders proudly announced that they had managed to halt and even reverse the drop in defence budgets and that, in 2016, defence spending for the whole of NATO actually increased in real terms for the first time since 2009.¹⁰ The number of European Member States who spend 2% or more of their GDP on defence increased from 2 in 2014 to 5 in 2017, and the number of those states that spend 20% on technical modernization rose from 6 to 12 (with an additional 4 allies being close to meeting that percentage).¹¹ So, there are clear signs of improvement. However, a more careful look at the data cools the enthusiasm. First, the increases in spending are noticeable among the Member States of the Eastern flank of NATO (which is quite understandable, considering their neighbourhood). However, irrespective of the fact that such improvements are necessary, highly appreciated and most probably done at significant cost to the other sections of these countries' budgets, the increases in defence spending are occurring primarily in Member States who

9. "[Wales Summit Declaration](#)," North Atlantic Council, Newport, 5 September 2014 (point 14).

10. "[Warsaw Summit Communiqué](#)," North Atlantic Council, Warsaw, 9 July 2016 (point 34).

11. For all data in full, see: "[Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries \(2010-2017\)](#)," NATO Press Release, PR/CP(2017)111, Brussels, 26 June 2017. The remainder of the paragraph also refers to this source unless otherwise stated.

are, on average, smaller (with the exception of Poland) and poorer (all Eastern member states) than the other states of the Alliance. Hence, despite their actual and symbolic value, these increases alone will not produce dramatic change. Critical to a real improvement in NATO's military capabilities would be a similar scale of growth in the defence budgets of the largest European allies (i.e. Germany, France, the UK, Italy or Spain).¹² Despite the changes, mentioned above, the share of defence spending in terms of the GDP of the European members of NATO is almost unchanged (1.45% in 2014, 1.47% in 2017). While the UK and France—the biggest military powers of Europe—spend more than 2% (UK) or are close to that level (France—1.79%), others are well below (Germany—1.22%, Italy—1.13%, Spain—0.92% for 2017).

Another issue concerns how the money is spent. An increase in resources devoted to defence could be wasted through misguided or unwise investments that are uncoordinated with other allies and do not properly address the Alliance's needs and development programs.¹³ Moreover, the structure of military spending is also important—the high level of expenditure on personnel reflects the flexibility of the defence budget of a given country and, therefore, its ability to speed up modernization. When a country like Portugal has to spend 78% of its budget on salaries and other personnel costs, it has little freedom to change its position, especially in the short term.

Obviously, it would be unrealistic to expect all members to achieve the 2% goal by 2024. The limits on the absorption of increased funding (problematic for the largest countries, in particular),¹⁴ the time-consu-

12. The combined defence budget of the Baltic states, V4, Bulgaria and Romania is USD 24.1 billion (12.2 billion excluding Poland), while Germany's is USD 47.1 billion, Italy's USD 23.7 billion and Spain's USD 13.9 billion. "[Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries \(2010-2017\)](#)."

13. It is somewhat worrying that even among those countries that started to spend more on defence, such as Poland, the investment priorities and development plans are drafted primarily on a national basis, without sufficient reflection on the utility of a given program or procurement for the Alliance as a whole.

14. For example Germany, with a defence budget of USD 43.2 billion in 2014 (1.19% of GDP; const. 2010 prices) would have to increase its budget by almost 3 billion annually to achieve the level of 2% of GDP in 2024 (c/a USD 72.6 billion in 2010 prices). That would probably mean wasteful spending by the military and could be difficult to reconcile with other budgetary requirements. See also: Alexander Mattelaer, "[Revisiting the principles of NATO Burden-Sharing](#)," *Parameters*, 46:1, 2016, p. 26-31.

ming nature of military equipment procurement and the need for political will and determination are particularly difficult to maintain when the budgetary and economic realities of some members are harsh (despite current economic growth in Europe). Allies pledged in Wales only to make an *effort* to reach the 2% level. Hence, the current “2% fetishism,” especially within the US leadership, could be counterproductive. The size of the Allies’ spending is a useful, but definitely not perfect, indicator of who constitutes a “good ally” and who does not. The rigid stance of the US may lead to disappointment rather than to improvement. The comparison between Denmark and Greece is illustrative here: the defence spending of the former is well below the 2% of GDP threshold, while the defence spending of the latter is traditionally above this threshold (and the Danes only started to spend close to 20% of their military budget on modernization in 2017, previously being at the 10% level); nevertheless,, it is Denmark, not Greece that is perceived as one of the most active, relatively capable, modern and integrated members of NATO. This is also due to Denmark’s substantial (actually higher than expected) involvement in NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya.¹⁵ Hence, some flexibility and “strategic patience,” when interpreting the results of the implementation of DIP, would be advisable. However, on several occasions President Trump has conditioned the scale of US involvement in NATO on the financial performance of allies (measured primarily by the “2% and 20%” indicators). He even said so explicitly in the latest US National Security Strategy.¹⁶ This behaviour could cause concerns about the presence of such “strategic patience” and flexibility in the whole of NATO.

NATO—EU Relations—How Much Could PESCO Change?

The strategic relevance of EU—NATO cooperation for both of these structures seems to be obvious, especially in the current security environment. Recently, both organizations made a substantial effort

15. John Deni, “[Burden Sharing and NATO’s 2 Percent Goal](#),” Carnegie Europe, Brussels, 14 April 2015.

16. “NATO alliance will become stronger when all members assume greater responsibility for and pay their fair share to protect our mutual interests, sovereignty, and values.” “[National Security Strategy of the United States of America](#),” White House, December 2017, p. 48.

to reinvigorate their relations, as evidenced by the participation of the EU’s highest representatives (President of the European Council Donald Tusk and High Representative for CSDP Federica Mogherini) in the NATO Warsaw summit and the special declaration on EU-NATO cooperation signed on that occasion. Importantly, this cooperation, for many years dominated by solemn high-level declarations that were often short on content and hollow,, began to be complemented (or even to some extent substituted) by a more pragmatic approach, including deeper coordination between the expeditionary operations of both organizations, in particular in the Mediterranean region (around the Libyan coast and in the Aegean Sea). The evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy was crucial in bringing about this change. This evolution includes the most recent achievement of the process—the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), envisioned in the Lisbon Treaty and initiated in late 2017.

Although it is too early to assess PESCO in its current form, this initiative is clearly not free of deficiencies.¹⁷ Nevertheless, thanks to its binding and voluntary character, the clear focus on developing military capabilities and the stimulation of industry cooperation, PESCO may provide real improvement in practical cooperation on defence and security in Europe. Hence, PESCO, together with the European Commission’s European Defence Fund (the program aimed at financing common research, development and acquisition projects in the security and defence realm, initiated in June 2017), could be a vehicle for the development of scientific and research cooperation, increased defence industry coordination and the integration of defence procurement. That would substantially supplement efforts conducted within the NATO framework in order to enhance members’ overall military capabilities. However, this can happen only if the PESCO agenda is

17. Many of the provisions of the PESCO notification document of November 2017, as well as the decision of the Council of the EU of December 2017 that confirmed initiation of the Cooperation, are very general and their interpretations could vary among the participants. Moreover, once planned as a kind of avant-garde to stimulate closer and, therefore, more effective cooperation between carefully selected partners, PESCO currently consists of all but 2 of the CSDP members (Malta and United Kingdom). That suggests that PESCO may be plagued by the very same problems as CSDP regarding effectiveness. Marcin Terlikowski, “PESCO and the Cohesion of European Defence Policy,” *PISM Bulletin*, n° 112 (1052), 2017.

not dominated by initiatives designed and developed in disregard of NATO's capability needs (including territorial defence requirements) and is not aimed solely at increasing Union (CSDP) ability to conduct autonomous missions outside Europe, especially in Africa.¹⁸ However, the currently widespread participation in PESCO could lead some countries to consider the establishment of a less inclusive, smaller but more efficient and internally cohesive group, a "SuperPESCO." Such an ambition could complicate the already complex cooperation both within Europe and between the EU and NATO.¹⁹ Therefore, PESCO remains both an opportunity and a risk for the future of transatlantic relations. European allies, in particular, should be aware of this.

Transatlantic links are under a new kind of "stress test." But, despite the differences among NATO members and the scale and diversity of external challenges and threats to the Alliance's cohesion and stability, one thing remains particularly relevant: neither Americans nor Europeans will find better, more reliable and sympathetic allies than each other, especially in such turbulent times. Hopefully, there

18. Fears over the possible excessive focus of the activities in the PESCO framework on crisis management capabilities (prioritized by many Western European states), at the expense of more conventional collective defence needs (as developed currently through NATO, but potentially also through CSDP/PESCO), is one of the main reasons for the cautious approach Poland and other "NATO Eastern Flankers" (Romania and the Baltic states) to this new European initiative. The possibility that PESCO could stimulate the growth of European defence spending, but simultaneously direct it this expenditure to the development of capabilities useful primarily for stabilization or peace-building missions, is considered a serious problem in the context of the validity and sustainability of NATO's recent initiatives to strengthen Eastern Flank, which cannot be performed correctly without the involvement of Western Europeans. There is also, particularly in Poland, some anxiety about the fate of the national defence industry (economically fragile, technologically relatively outdated and therefore not very competitive) under the conditions of a more integrated and open European defence market after full implementation of PESCO and EDF. Justyna Gotkowska, "[The CSDP's renaissance. Challenges and opportunities for the eastern flank](#)," *OSW Commentary*, n° 243, June 26, 2017, p. 5-7.

19. Taking into account that some participants, like Poland, although generally supportive of the idea of PESCO, have seemingly joined it partly to be able—as full participants in the decision-making process—to steer it in their own preferred direction or to block/slow down any decision they don't like, the temptation for other participants to develop an inner structure within PESCO could arise sooner rather than later. Comp. Piotr Buras, "[Europe and Its Discontents: Poland's Collision Course with the European Union](#)," *ECFR Issue Brief*, September 2017, esp. p. 7-8.

is enough awareness of this fact on both sides of the Atlantic and the sober assessment of a lack of available alternatives, especially in light of current members' security needs, will persuade all states to pursue a more effective cooperation.

NATO AFTER THE WARSAW SUMMIT: BACK TO BASICS?

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ABSTRACT

Following the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016, the orientations of the Atlantic Alliance have been redefined. In the nineties, NATO had switched its missions from collective defence to crisis management and peacekeeping. Following the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the outbreak of the war in the Donbass in Ukraine, NATO Member States have again put collective defence at the centre of their priorities. At the Warsaw summit, the strengthening of the Eastern flank was decided upon. While this reinforcement was intended to symbolize solidarity among Member States, it has been weakened since the election of US President Donald Trump.

INTRODUCTION

The reorientation of NATO's missions and the war in Ukraine shed light on the three challenges that the Atlantic Alliance is currently facing. Firstly, the relationship between NATO and the EU: the election of Donald Trump, alongside Brexit, opens a window of opportunity for the development of European defence and the redefinition of the link between both organizations. Secondly, the authoritarian drift of

several NATO Member States questions the very foundations of the Alliance. Finally, the annexation of Crimea acutely raises the Russian question but also that of the near-failure of the NATO partnership policy, because this conflict places NATO partners in opposition to one another.

REDEFINITION OF THE LINK BETWEEN NATO AND THE EU

The first challenge that the Atlantic Alliance is facing is the rethinking of the transatlantic link. This need is mainly due to the numerous declarations¹ of Donald Trump during the US presidential campaign on the obsolescence of NATO or the fact that the US will only help those allies who spend 2% of their budget on defence. During his first participation in a NATO summit in May 2017, D. Trump particularly stressed the weakness of European military budgets, saying that some European countries owe “*huge sums of money*” to NATO.² These declarations, potentially challenging the common security clause of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, cast doubt on the solidarity between allies and therefore on the *raison d'être* of the Alliance. Moreover, for some observers, such as former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, it would be unrealistic to expect Donald Trump to have an attitude towards NATO similar to that of his predecessors: “*We must now doubt the US commitment*”.³ However, some members of the Administration tempered Trump’s claims. While Defence Secretary James Mattis recalled that each ally had to take its share of the burden, he also said that NATO was a “*fundamental bedrock*” for the United States.⁴

1. Consider for example, this declaration made during an electoral meeting in July 2016 : “People aren’t paying their fair share. And then the stupid people, they say: ‘But we have a treaty.’ They say: ‘What would happen if Russia or somebody attacks?’ I said: ‘I don’t know; have they paid?’ ... ‘Well, they haven’t paid, but we have a treaty.’ “I said: ‘Yeah, they have a treaty too – they have to pay.’ We’re gonna end up in world war three protecting people and these people can pay,” in “Donald Trump reiterates he will only help Nato countries that pay ‘fair share,’” *The Guardian*, 18 July 2016.

2. “À l’OTAN, Donald Trump met les Européens sous pression et ne les rassure pas,” *Le Monde*, 26 May 2017.

3. Interview of former NATO Secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *Le Monde*, 24 October 2017 (Author’s translation).

4. “OTAN : les États-Unis réclament un ferme engagement des Européens dans la défense,” *Le Monde*, 15 February 2017 (Author’s translation).

Redefinition also means that Europeans must consider the possibility of creating a European army. Indeed, European defence already partly exists. Since the Helsinki Accords, no fewer than 30 civilian and military missions have been led by the European Union. However, these are mainly peacekeeping or crisis management missions. In fact, the EU must develop methods and modalities of action allowing it to ensure its own territorial defence. To enable this change while maintaining the transatlantic link, a new institutional arrangement must be found with NATO.

The Berlin-plus agreement⁵ is the framework for NATO-EU relations. Signed in 2002, it no longer corresponds to the current strategic situation. Indeed, in the early 2000s, NATO and the EU had adopted a comprehensive approach to security and were moving towards crisis management missions and peacekeeping operations that were mainly outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, Berlin agreements aimed to institutionalize the links between the EU and NATO that were non-existent during the Cold War. Finally, this agreement was part of NATO’s re-legitimization strategies: it was designed to create links with existing organizations in order to prove NATO’s relevance and ensure its sustainability.

However, for the EU, Berlin-plus also meant, after the failure of European states to reach an agreement to intervene in the former Yugoslavia,⁶ the abandonment of the construction of an autonomous European defence. It also revealed tensions between Member States since—for most of the Atlanticists among them, such as Great Britain, Denmark or the Netherlands—it was inconceivable to envisage a truly autonomous, let alone independent, European defence.

Nevertheless, this agreement has proven its limits and its inability to meet the needs of partners because it has been used only

5. Framework of the relations between NATO and the EU:

https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_49217.htm?selectedLocale=en#.

6. European countries were sharply divided on the Yugoslav question: Germany supported the Croats, France was closer to Serbia, and Italy favoured regional consultation. Bonn’s rush to recognize the new states, which was described by the American negotiator Richard Holbrooke as the biggest collective error of the West since the 1930s, aggravated the dissension. On a military level, London refused the proposal of Paris and Berlin to involve the WEU in Croatia. Disagreements related to the technical means and the strategy, the reasons to intervene, the division of tasks between allies and the place of NATO in the missions.

twice since its creation, and each time simply to take over from existing operations. Since then, any attempt to change it has resulted in policy statements, because of the complexity of the process of revising Berlin-plus, the fear of decoupling and also because Berlin-plus is a compromise that takes into account the conflict between Cyprus, an EU member and Turkey, a non-EU NATO member.

The revival of European defence with the creation of a European Defence Fund by the European Commission,⁷ which has been positively welcomed by all Member States and PESCO (Permanent Cooperation Structure), could be a basis for both strengthening European defence and rethinking its relationship with NATO.

THE AUTHORITARIAN DRIFT

The renegotiation of the transatlantic link is taking place in a delicate context for the Alliance. Indeed, NATO is not only weakened by the statements of D. Trump undermining Atlantic solidarity but also by the illiberal, and even authoritarian, drifts of several Member States such as Hungary, Poland and Turkey. These processes weaken the Alliance because they create political tensions, for instance Turkish president Erdoğan criticisms of NATO allies for not giving him firm support during the failed coup attempt in 2016. More importantly, if some members are at odds with the liberal and democratic values that NATO is supposed to embody, its stated goal of being a community of values working to build a democratic and liberal order loses its credibility.

However, the authoritarian drift not only challenges the political character of the Alliance but also its military efficiency. After the coup, numerous purges were conducted in Turkey: 149 generals out of 358, 10,840 officers and soldiers were sacked as well as 400 attachés working for NATO. By February 2018, only 40% of them have been replaced.⁸ Their sacking was lamented by General Scaparotti, NATO

7. The purpose of the European Defence Fund is to finance the establishment of joint research, development and procurement projects in the fields of defence and security.

8. "L'armée turque s'éloigne de ses partenaires occidentaux," *Le Monde*, 14 February 2018 and "Turkey Military Purges Has 'Degraded' NATO, Says General," *The Financial Times*, 7 December 2016.

SACEUR, especially because it involved senior personnel with considerable experience. According to the SACEUR, this purge has degraded not only NATO but also the military capacities of Turkey, and the reconstruction of the Turkish army will take several years, in particular in the field of aviation, because fighter pilots require extensive and complex training.⁹

The same observation applies to Poland. This country was considered one of the powerful members of NATO. A metaphor of a Polish officer illustrates the deterioration of the Polish position within the Alliance: "When I was working there, we had a seat, and by the fireplace. I think that now not only are we standing, but also somewhere near the door."¹⁰ On the domestic front, since the election of the new PiS government in 2015,¹¹ the Ministry of Defence has faced considerable criticism. Many generals and senior officers have resigned. In addition to resignations, tensions between Defence Minister Macierewicz and President Duda have prevented the appointment of new generals since July 2017.¹² While the Polish army should have a hundred generals, there are now only 65, and none are at the level of 4 stars.¹³ However, following the cabinet reshuffle of January 2018 and the appointment of a new Defence Minister, fourteen generals have been appointed.

Besides some of the former Minister Macierewicz's actions—such as the raid on NATO's Center of Expertise and Counterintelligence (CEK) in Warsaw in order to seize safes, materials and archives—have sparked the mistrust of NATO allies. Even if the CEK is functioning and has since received official NATO accreditation, some allies have distanced themselves from it.¹⁴ Finally, the creation within the Ministry of Defence of a cell, known as the Smolensk Subcommittee, in charge

9. "Turkey Military Purges Has 'Degraded' NATO, Says General," *op. cit.*, and interview with a former French officer at SHAPE.

10. Interview with a Polish general who has worked in NATO structures for three years in "NATO nie ma zgody," *Polityka*, 29 April 2017 (Author's translation).

11. PiS party (Law and Justice) won the presidential election in May 2015 and the legislative elections in November 2015.

12. Antoni Macierewicz lost the position of Minister for Defence after a cabinet reshuffle in January 2018.

13. "Krajobraz po Macierewiczu w dziejach wojska polskiego," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 13 January 2018.

14. *Ibid.* Following the cabinet reshuffle.

of investigating the 2010 air crash, arouses considerable tension since its purpose was to prove that the crash was planned by former Polish Prime Minister and current President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, together with the Russian authorities.¹⁵

These tensions overshadow the efforts of the Polish government in the field of defence: the size of the army should be increased, while 2.5% of the GDP is devoted to defence, and Poland hosts the multinational division northeast HQ that coordinates the NATO troops of the EFP in Poland and the Baltic states. But the modernization of the armed forces has been hampered by the creation of the Territorial Guard, the fifth branch of the armed forces.¹⁶

THE RUSSIAN QUESTION

The annexation of Crimea has put Russia at the centre of the concerns of European states, the EU and NATO. Added to this are Russia's intimidation practices: the Zapad military exercises, the nuclear threats against some members of the Alliance as well as the covert influence in the recent American and French elections.

This return of the Russian question has several implications for NATO. First, it challenges the validity of the partnership policy initiated by the Alliance. In the early nineties, NATO had created a network composed of the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and special commissions linking NATO to some countries like Ukraine and Georgia. But this network did not allow the construction of a Euro-

15. The Smolensk sub-commission published its technical report on April 11th, 2018: the crash was caused by explosions. This rapport was sent to the prosecutor.

16. The Territorial Guard was created by the PiS government. It was to have 53,000 members, but according to official figures, it would have recruited only 13,000 people (the unofficial figures evoke 8,000). The members of the Territorial Guard are responsible for assisting the other 4 branches of the army during a conflict, assisting in natural disasters, defending society against destabilization and misinformation, and increasing patriotic feeling. For this, they receive a training program of sixteen days as well as monthly training. The Guard's budget is 580 million zloty, the equivalent of that of the navy and more than that of the special forces (cf.: "Krajobraz po Macierewiczu w dziejach wojska polskiego," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 13 January 2018 and website of the Polish MoD : <http://www.mon.gov.pl/obrona-terytorialna/o-nas/zadania-wot-n2016-12-27/>).

Atlantic order of cooperation, peace and security, despite this being the stated goal of NATO.

The Russian-Georgian and Russian-Ukrainian conflicts bear the mark of this failure because they opposed NATO partners. They also show the ambiguity of these partnerships because the security clauses contained in the charters between NATO, Ukraine and Georgia have proved their limits, since they have not prevented Russian aggression and have not triggered a response from NATO. In fact, these conflicts have brought out the difference between the status of ally and partner, even though the aim of the partnerships was to ease the differentiation between the Alliance and its neighbours.¹⁷ It also proves that NATO is not able to act as protection or a moderating factor. This role is largely denied by Russian elites who consider NATO an anachronistic reminiscence of the Cold War and deny its legitimacy. In fact, the partnership policy has not enabled lasting structural changes and the construction of a peaceful liberal order.

Faced with these Russian dynamics, the Allies maintain a united front. If, during the summits, no divergence appears publicly, minor disagreements still exist. In April 2016, in France, against the wishes of the Socialist government, deputies of the National Assembly voted on a resolution calling for the lifting of sanctions.¹⁸ A similar request was made in 2015 by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban; Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras described the sanctions as counterproductive; and Czech President Zeman, one month after the annexation of Crimea, declared that the annexation was irreversible.¹⁹ These differences in opinion did not lead to a change in policy: NATO maintains its firm stance against Moscow.

However, some uncertainties come from Turkey and Poland. The tensions between the allies and Ankara are partly due to the

17. Rebecca S. Moore, "The Purpose of NATO Partnership: Sustaining Liberal Order beyond the Ukraine Crisis," in Rebecca S. Moore and Damon Coletta (eds.), *NATO's Return to Europe, Engaging Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond*, Georgetown University Press, 2017, p. 167-192.

18. "L'Assemblée vote une résolution en faveur de la levée des sanctions contre la Russie," *Le Monde*, 24 April 2016.

19. "En Grèce, Vladimir Poutine en compagnie contre les sanctions de l'UE," *Le Monde*, 28 May 2016 and Georges Mink, "L'Europe centrale à l'épreuve de l'autoritarisme," *Politique étrangère*, 81:2, 2016, p. 89-101.

so-called “Turkish strategic turning point.” This is visible in Turkey’s weapons policy. Ankara wanted to buy anti-missile systems from China, but this contract was cancelled due to strong opposition from NATO members. Turkey then acquired the anti-missile systems from Russia, which has again aroused critics from NATO, as this system is not compatible with NATO standards. However, Ankara did not turn away from Western suppliers, as it recently bought an air protection system from the Franco-Italian group Eurosam. But from the perspective of some NATO officials, the Turkish arms purchasing policy, as well as the signature of a strategic partnership with Russia in 2016, demonstrates the importance of the Turkish strategic turn. On the other hand, Turkish authorities affirm their willingness to develop their own defence industry.²⁰

On the Polish side, an investigation by a journalist of the liberal daily *Gazeta Wyborcza* revealed the relationship between A. Macierewicz, Minister of Defence, from November 2015 to January 2018, with former members of the intelligence services of communist Poland and with a former Republican senator (turned Lockheed Martin lobbyists) who has ties to the Italian and Russian mafias in New York and to Russian military counterintelligence.²¹ Just as authoritarian tendencies can damage the NATO alliance, so can these practices.

To counter the Russian threat, NATO members have taken several initiatives. Battalions have been deployed in Poland and the Baltic states following the Warsaw summit of 2016. These deployments are mainly symbolic and are to demonstrate the solidarity of the Allies, since troops came from nearly all NATO countries. As they are on

20. “Erdogan, chef de l’entreprise de défense turque,” *Le Monde*, 24 February 2018.

21. Tomasz Piatek, *Macierewicz i jego tajemnice*, Arbitor, 2016. For this book, T. Piatek won the “Journalist of the Year” award from Reporters Without Borders. It should be recalled that in 2006, A. Macierewicz, already Minister of Defence in the PiS government, published a report on the liquidation of the Military Information Service and asked for its translation into Russian. If the liquidation of the Service was agreed, the dissemination and translation of the report, which should have been classified as a defence secret, was strongly criticized because it revealed the name of Polish agents, the details of the operation in progress and the working methods of Polish intelligence. Even within NATO, these broadcasts and translations had caused total misunderstanding “Pologne, les accointances russes d’un ministre-clé,” *Le Monde*, 18 July 2017 and “NATO nie ma zgody,” *Polityka*, 29 April 2017).

a rotational basis, these deployments demonstrate NATO’s commitment to the 1997 Founding Act, unlike Russia, which has infringed it many times.²² The Allies are also considering the possibility of strengthening NATO’s capabilities. A report to that effect was leaked to *Der Spiegel* in October 2017.²³ The purpose of the leak was to convince the most reluctant allies of the need to fill the gaps in the Alliance. But here again consensus will probably be difficult to build: if Berlin is in favour of strengthening the NATO structure, France is more cautious while Britain and the United States do not want to cancel the effects of the reform of the Lisbon Summit in 2010, which reduced the number of soldiers.

In fact, the structure of NATO has been greatly reduced since the end of the Cold War: there are no more than 7 NATO commands today where there were originally 33. These peace dividends have resulted in the creation of new types of NATO missions, such as peacekeeping.²⁴ As in the case of the building of links with the EU after the end of the Cold War, this reorientation was part of NATO’s re-legitimization strategies and the need to ensure its sustainability, because its enemy, the USSR, had disappeared. NATO has, therefore, invested in a new type of mission that was previously foreign to it in order to ensure its *raison d’être*.

The report points to several important issues. First of all, there are infrastructural flaws: heavy equipment cannot circulate on many bridges, trains and roads. In addition, administrative harmonization must be established to ease the circulation of allied troops within NATO countries.²⁵ Finally, the Rapid Reaction Force is hindered by these problems because it would be too slow to deploy, have too few officers and would have problems of supply. The slowness of NATO

22. For more details on the Warsaw summit and the Enhanced Force Presence, see Amélie Zima “Sommet de l’OTAN à Varsovie : un bilan,” *Politique étrangère*, n° 4, 2016, p. 87-97 ; see also the Warsaw summit communiqué (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm) and the description of the EFP (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm).

23. “NATO Grapples with Serious Organizational Shortcomings,” *Der Spiegel*, 20 October 2017.

24. Christophe Wasinski, “Produire de la gestion de crise internationale – Les cas de l’OTAN pendant les années 2000,” *Cultures & Conflits*, n° 75, hiver 2009, p. 11-27.

25. “NATO Grapples with Serious Organizational Shortcomings,” *Der Spiegel*, 20 October 2017.

must be contrasted with the speed at which Russia annexed Crimea. Yet NATO has a real numerical superiority over Russia: it has 3.2 million soldiers against Russia's 830 000, 9800 tanks against 3000 and 6100 aircraft against 1900.²⁶

The solution would be to reinforce the command structures to manage problems of logistics, communication and refuelling. It would also be necessary to integrate the capabilities of allies in the field of cybersecurity—cyberspace being considered as one of the fields of NATO activity in the same way as land, sea and air.²⁷ Finally, a military Schengen should be created to facilitate the movement of troops within the Alliance countries.²⁸ This last point seems the most complicated to implement. The implementation of this military Schengen must take into account the fact that painful history can have an influence on foreign and defence policies. For the Czechs, at the time of NATO membership in 1999, it was not easy to change their Constitution to facilitate the movement of Allied troops and the holding of military exercises on their soil. The changes only occurred in 2001. The reluctance was based on the trauma of the Soviet invasion of 1968. Moreover, at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016, the Czechs and Slovaks refused the presence of Allied troops for the same reason.

CONCLUSION

To address all these issues, some observers, including former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, believe that it would be necessary for NATO to have a new strategic concept. This is because the current concept was drafted to deal with a completely different strategic environment, one in which NATO was primarily expeditionary. This new concept should also recognize the evolution of NATO's relationship with Russia. Finally, it must also consider the Alliance's position on nuclear deterrence,

26. *Ibid.*

27. "Face à Moscou, l'OTAN muscle son état-major," *Le Monde*, 15 February 2018.

28. "NATO's Problem in Europe is Mobilization," *The Wall Street Journal*, 10 January 2018.

because of the defence policies of both North Korea²⁹ and Russia, especially Russia, since the last Russian strategic doctrine envisaged the use of nuclear weapons for de-escalation purposes. Thus NATO, as in the early nineties, is at a crossroads.

29. North Korean authorities have announced on April 21th, 2018 that they would halt missile and nuclear tests.

EUROPEAN UNION. ITS PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

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ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the challenges the European Union is facing today, plunged in various crises and focused on their long-term resolution. The focus of the EU on emerging internal challenges has resulted in its closing in on itself, leaving external issues in the background. At the same time, new threats have emerged. The article underlines the lack of perception at the EU level of the expectations of the citizens of Member States and of the other countries. It seems for the author that EU decision makers and officials do not see the specific concerns of individual countries, do not take into account their history, tradition and current situation, and thus are unable to approach the issues in a different way. They do not look at the emerging challenges and problems from a different perspective and do not look for solutions that would be adequate and acceptable to all parties.

INTRODUCTION

The European Union, since its creation under the Rome treaty that established the European Economic Community, has acted on the international stage, striven to have a role in shaping global order and deepened cooperation between Member States. Its involvement in global economic activity and humanitarian aid has been strengthe-

ned since the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, which established a Common Foreign and Security Policy and, later, by establishing a Common Security and Defence Policy, which symbolized closer and deeper integration. At that time, the Union began to implement missions and operations, the scope and purpose of which evolved over the years and as new needs related to peace and security arose, both internally and externally, in the immediate neighbourhood and in far-off countries like Afghanistan or Iraq. Previously, the European Union focused largely on conducting its foreign, security and defence projects in accordance with the principles of international law, EU law and, more importantly, mainstream values and the liberal approach. The steps taken often turned out to be wrong, late or ineffective, and their medium (dialogue, mediation and political consultations) could not lead to success. An example of the above is undoubtedly the war in the former Yugoslavia, where without the help of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it would not have been possible to put an end to the conflict and stabilize the situation in the region.¹

CHANGE IN THE EU'S GLOBAL APPROACH

A change in approach and in thinking, but not yet in organization, began after the terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2004, strengthened after the attacks in 2015. These attacks prompted a dynamic acceleration in organizational change and a slow departure from the liberal approach. There was also a desire to build a new way of acting towards the rising problems, by searching for the causes of these global challenges and addressing them at their roots, using ideas, values, pragmatism and realistic concepts. Actions taken externally are in line with the general principles respected in the European Union and a new pragmatic approach to action.² Internal action also reflects these principles and this approach, as it is necessary to reconcile the vision of the European Commission, the Council, and the Member States, given that the lat-

1. Joyce P. Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., Maryland, 2003.

2. Pragmatism is described and explained as a new approach towards EU activity in "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy," Brussels, 2016.

ter have broad autonomy to manage their own foreign policy, security and defence challenges. At the same time, the European Union tried to encourage deeper integration through the development of certain ideas, such as the idea that common foreign policy would strengthen the unity of the community. This was very motivating for states between 1945 and 1991, when one of the main aspects of the external policy concerned the management of relations with the Soviet Union and the construction of a counterbalance to its growing political, military and ideological influence, and when the internal aspect focused on the rebuilding of the economies of war-affected countries. Unfortunately, this motivation disappeared after 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union.³ The first—external—aspect lost its significance and was replaced by efforts to prevent Russia from re-emerging as a significant international player, to stabilize the region by regulation, prevention and reconstruction after the outbreak of successive conflicts and regional wars. After the 2001 and 2004 terrorist attacks, a completely new perspective on the external objectives of CFSP and CSDP emerged, with a particular focus on how to combat asymmetrical threats. The internal aspect has not changed profoundly, but new dimensions have been introduced: migrant crisis, rising nationalism,⁴ ethnicity and social rebellion against globalization, as well as resistance to domination by any supranational institutions and growing processes of disintegration. These internal challenges make it necessary to build more advanced and complex forms of cooperation and to overcome the difficulties in order to tackle problems related to multicultural societies, both in Europe and in the wider world.

NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE EU

The new challenges and the new quality of international relations, as well as deep differences in the opinions of Member States and their societies, have led to the revival of efforts to identify new aspects linking European countries to the ideals of the European

3. Paweł Olszewski, *System euroatlantycki w świetle agendy bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej i Stanów Zjednoczonych*, ISP PAN, 2013, p. 11.

4. B. Laffan, R. O'Donnell, M. Smith, *Europe's Experimental Union: Rethinking Integration*, Routledge, London, 2000.

Union. These problems arising within the EU's borders are often outside of the institutional system of the EU. They are strengthened and developed—sometimes unwittingly, sometimes deliberately—by the actions of EU officials and the conflicts between Member States and EU institutions, i.e. conflicts as to what elements should be treated as intergovernmental versus supranational. The main problem, however, remains the effectiveness of decisions, which largely depends on the mobilization of the parties involved and the resources they deploy and, in particular, on the coherence of the actions taken at every level of the decision-making process. The process must enable a consensus between national interests and the institutional interests of the Community. Another important issue is the decreasing identification of EU member societies with the ideas and policies of integration. This trend evidently contributes towards feelings of disintegration. “Many citizens perceive the EU as a distant political apparatus, which lacks resilient debates about the future of European integration and the objectives and content of EU policies. Citizens consider themselves unable to influence the Union’s decision-making process. The EU is perceived as an alienated bureaucratic machinery, where citizens are the objects and not the sovereign of European policy—making.”⁵ Feelings of disintegration are not only connected with internal matters but also with the external activity and decisions of the EU. The new dimensions of the problems that appeared in international relations at that time are primarily as follows: the awakening of national liberation and state-building aspirations among nations, groups and communities in similar positions or statuses to the Kosovo Albanians, with regard to the invariability of borders; the growing rivalry between Russia and Western countries for dominance in the region; and the emergence of serious differences of opinion on the European arena. First of all, any national minority in the world may consider Kosovo’s declaration of independence as a precedent and, therefore, strive to create an independent state or to obtain broad autonomy. This process can be initiated in societies with significant distinguishing characteristics (culture, tradition and language). Within the European Union, we

5. Janis A. Emmanouilidis, “Europe’s Role in the Twenty – First Century,” in Thomas Renard, Sven Biscop (eds.), *The European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century: How Europe Can Shape a New Global Order*, Ashgate, 2012, p. 92.

can list here, for example, the Basques, Catalans or Scotland, all societies that have large communities with strong aspirations for autonomy and separation. For example, strong secession movements could be observed in 2017 in Spain, which is neither the last nor the least example of this trend.

Another problem concerns the societies of Member States that seem to be tired of weak politicians, the lack of a stable political concept, and the lack of charismatic leaders in EU structures. In his article, Józef M. Fiszer has underlined this problem, by arguing: “In most European countries, citizens have lost confidence in it, and the process of disintegration is growing. This is because the EU does not have charismatic leaders, visionaries or eminent politicians. It is being managed today by bureaucrats and party activists, detached from people and their needs.”⁶

The slogan about values, unity and being united in diversity is not enough to motivate people to support integration. There is a strong need for security guarantees and stable development. For some part of the societies, there is also a need for the protection of traditional national values and a feeling of a growing threat to their identities, which causes increased distrust of European political elites. This issue became visible in the most recent elections in Poland, Hungary, France, Germany and Italy, as well as in the Brexit referendum. However, it is extremely difficult for politicians and EU officials to understand these processes. In order to do so, nationalist parties should not be considered as isolated from the current situation in the EU and its wider social attitudes. They should also not be seen as emerging only during economic crisis or because of terrorism, and disappearing in a period of prosperity, as it does not allow acknowledging the manifest change in social attitudes and social moods. Above all the growing strength of nationalist factions should not be seen as temporary and might in fact be an expression of the growing trend towards independence, national sovereignty and regional cooperation. This cooperation would only be implemented on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation and not a

6. Józef M. Fiszer, “Unia Europejska. Jedenaście lat od rozszerzenia na wschód i jej perspektywy w XXI wieku,” *Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna*, Uczelnia Łazarskiego, 1:48, 2015.

European federation or confederation designed to replace or minimize the role of the nation state.⁷

From the European Union, there is also no clear message about how the goals and aims of the EU institutions will benefit the public. This creates the impression that people are less important than policies. President Jean-Claude Juncker, in his 2017 “State of the Union Address,” described, as he did the previous year, “a Europe that protects, a Europe that empowers, a Europe that defends.”⁸ However, he does not provide specific information on how this development will be implemented. It is rather a statement of goodwill and a willingness to further develop the EU. This highlights the main problem of the EU: the axiological crisis in the EU and the crisis of real political leadership in the EU, which influences the foreign and security policy of the European Union. It seems, however, that the European political elite is beginning to understand. According to Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in her introduction to the global strategy, “The goal of our Union, and even its existence, is questioned.”⁹ It is difficult to find one reason for this. Just as European integration is a continuous process, the current EU crisis is also a process, made up of various and often contradictory elements, the crisis of European axiology and leadership, the threat of international terrorism, and a migration crisis threatening not only the unity of Europe, but also its security in the long-term.

DIRECTIONS OF POLAND’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION

Since 2015, we have been dealing with the policy of international isolationism of Poland, expressed in the domination of national interest and pride as well as growing national sovereignty over the inte-

7. More about differentiated integration: D. Leuffen, B. Rittberger, F. Schimelfennig, *Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

8. European Commission – Speech, President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017, Brussels, 13 September 2017.

9. Federica Mogherini preface, “A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,” CFSP/PESC 543 CSDP/PSDC 395, Brussels 2016, p. 1.

rest of the European community. This leads to the strengthening of the domestic perspective that shapes external relations: “In the view of the Law and Justice Party, the aforementioned necessity to strengthen the internal sovereignty of the state, i.e. the ability of its organs to manage effectively, also in the face of external threats, conflicts with the liberal democracy model considered by all Member States (with the exception of Hungary) and the EU institutions as the standard of the political model in this community.”¹⁰

The model for the implementation of national interests would not differ significantly from the implementation of national policies of other Member States, if not for its decisive emphasis on the historical policy and the use of external issues to strengthen the party’s position in the country.

Poland, in its current efforts to shape national and regional security, is strengthening cooperation with the United States and wants to reconstruct the role and importance of the Visegrad Group. Poland has also joined projects to create a European community security organization by joining the PESCO and supporting the European Defence Initiative.

Contrary to 2005–2007, rulers are not looking towards the enemy outside, and Poland’s current problems mainly result from internal policies such as changes concerning the judiciary or the Constitutional Tribunal. However, this overall picture may be distorted, as the PiS government has required war reparations from Germany, but this is largely a question of building political capital within the state. In addition, the change of the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs result from the will to create a change in foreign policy and to shape good relations with partners in the European Union. After the change of government in January 2018, tensions eased between Poland and the EU, as shown by the meeting between Foreign Affairs Minister Jacek Czaputowicz and First Vice-President of the EU Commission Frans Timmermans and the suspension of tree felling in the Białowieża Primary Forest.

10. A. Balcer, P. Buras, G. Gromadzki, E. Smolar, *Jaka zmiana? Założenia i perspektywy polityki zagranicznej rządu PiS*, Fundacja Batorego, 2016. <http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Otwarta%20Europa/Jaka%20zmiana%20w%20polityce%20zagranicznej.pdf>.

The changes introduced in foreign policy priorities and those in the field of integration did not bring about the strengthening of Poland's role, and even caused problems in the international arena. First of all, the government marginalized Germany in its policy, and based itself on the Eurosceptic UK, which is leaving the European Union. Relations with the United States firstly tightened but are now becoming worse, as the United States reacted sharply to the Institute of National Remembrance's Act and supported the position of Israel. This is an unfortunate setback, as Poland needs the support of the US on security issues, especially for the reinforcement of the Eastern flank decided by NATO in 2016. Another problem is the occasional slogans regarding the potential exit of Poland from the European Union. But these are neither confirmed by surveys, nor by the government's rhetoric that is pro-integrative.

Finally, strengthening regional cooperation like the Visegrad Group and developing other regional initiatives is a process that enables shaping Poland's strong position in the region. Unfortunately, these concepts do not encourage Poland's supporters at the European level because they are not taken seriously although the Polish government is strongly supporting common security policy at the EU level.

CONCLUSION

To face the current challenges, the European Union must be one of the poles of the new international order, stabilizing and creating internal and external spaces of activity. But it is not really prepared for these roles both in terms of concept and operation. First, the EU's plans and activities should be adapted to the current international situation and, second, the EU's security policy and internal development priorities should be defined in the future, through specific implementation instruments that currently do not exist. In addition, the European Union closed itself off during its own internal crisis and focused on saving the common economy, and preserving monetary unity, rather than on building a new reality and creating a position for itself in the eyes of Member States, citizens and externally on the world stage. This focus on internal problems is obviously natural and necessary. However, neglect of the international situation is already proving a

decisive threat to the Union and it is accelerating the process of marginalization of this organization worldwide. However, this process of marginalization began before the crisis and was further fuelled by it. It has much deeper origins: in the initial phase of establishing communities and creating policies. Therefore, the Union must strengthen social participation in the decision-making process, which it has already done under the Treaty of Lisbon and listen more closely to the needs and expectations of the citizens of Member States.

It should also pay more attention to the diversity of Member States both in terms of their history and identity as well as their expectations. It should also be more actively involved in the creation of a new international order, basing its internal and external actions on the precepts of realism, and strengthening ideas and values. It should not rely too much on idealism or the policy of 'soft power.' As a result, the prospects for EU development, the tightening of integration and the extension of global influence will be improved, and citizens will be convinced of the rightness of the EU's existence. The EU will then be perceived as a long-term guarantor of the values and aspirations that it proclaims, namely peace, security, stable development, democracy and prosperity.

FRANCE, POLAND AND THE RELAUNCH OF EU DEFENCE COOPERATION

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ABSTRACT

This article looks back at the causes of the revival of European defence in the 2010s. Several cyclical factors can explain this recovery: financial reasons, such as the crisis encouraging economies of scale, security reasons such as terrorism and political reasons, such as the election of Trump and Brexit. While the Member States have largely supported this revival, the author nevertheless points out that the EU is facing a geostrategic dilemma: the need to face security issues in both the South and East. However, from the example of EUFOR Bangui, he shows that this dilemma can be overcome by transactions between Member States.

INTRODUCTION

French-Polish dialogue is particularly important in matters of defence, because France and Poland are the two main Member States of the European Union (EU) currently in demand for military cooperation. Admittedly, they are in demand for different reasons and with different preferences. France is mainly focused on the Southern flank and the terrorist threat, while Poland is focused on the Eastern flank

and the Russian threat. However, both countries share the fundamental assumption that security is a priority and that more effort should be made in terms of defence cooperation in order to cope with current security challenges. Moreover, even if their views are very different, they are also complementary, in the sense that a compromise between French and Polish preferences would arguably be close to a European centre of gravity.

In this paper I will discuss the origins and current relaunch of EU defence cooperation from a French perspective. I will focus in particular on two important initiatives, the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Then I will argue that one of the main obstacles to European Defence cooperation is currently the geostrategic dilemma posed by the Eastern and the Southern flanks, that is, the competition between these two distinct strategic priorities. However, I will argue that this dilemma could be solved through a type of transaction between those states focusing on the East and those focusing on the South. I will conclude by arguing that France and Poland could be the leading actors of such transactions.

THE CSDP: ORIGINS AND DISILLUSIONMENT

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was initially made possible by a French-British initiative.¹ For a long time, France had promoted the idea of EU defence cooperation, but the UK had vetoed any development in that direction, because of its strictly Atlanticist position. However, both countries shared some interests. First, they shared an interest in crisis management that led the UK to realize, after the Balkan wars, that the US could not always be relied on to cope with European crises, and that Europeans may sometimes have to act alone. Second, they shared an interest in Africa that led France and the UK to increasingly coordinate their military policies on that continent.² However, what made the 1998 Saint Malo agreement a strong basis

1. Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative," *Survival*, 42: 2, 2000, p. 33-55.

2. Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming, "Beyond Fashoda: Anglo-French Security Cooperation in Africa Since Saint-Malo," *International affairs*, 86: 5, 2010, p. 1129-1147.

for EU-wide compromise was that France and the UK also held complementary positions. France insisted on the EU's strategic autonomy, whereas the UK insisted on not duplicating NATO.

Since the early 2000s, the EU has launched a dozen military operations, generally at France's initiative. But these operations have been generally limited in scope and ambition and difficult to launch. France has often struggled to elicit contributions from other Member States.³ The climax of France's disillusionment with CSDP operations was EUFOR Chad/CAR (2007).⁴ France promoted the operation and provided half of the troops. However, Germany and the UK refused to participate. Germany, in particular, argued that the operation was designed only to defend French neo-colonial interests. It should be noted, however, that Poland sent 400 soldiers. A second example is the Libyan war (2011).⁵ Germany refused to support the intervention, while the UK vetoed any EU involvement, and France, which initially wanted to use this operation to demonstrate the EU's capacity, eventually had to rely on the US and NATO.

THE RELAUNCH OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION

More recently, the emergence of a new strategic context has encouraged the relaunch of EU defence cooperation:

- The budgetary crisis that has been ongoing since 2010 has put defence budgets under pressure and created an incentive to cooperate in order to generate economies of scale.
- Russia's new assertiveness and the Ukrainian crisis has made defence a priority again and spread the idea that European defence capabilities have to be strengthened.
- The terrorist and refugee crises have demonstrated that overseas crises can have a strong impact on internal issues. That has led some

3. Tobias Koepf, "Interventions françaises en Afrique: la fin de l'euphorisation?," *Politique étrangère*, n° 2, 2012, p. 415-426.

4. Jean-Yves Haine, "The Failure of a European Strategic Culture – EUFOR CHAD: The Last of its Kind?," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 32: 3, 2011, p. 582-603.

5. Nicole Koenig, "The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?," *The International Spectator*, 46:4, p. 11-30.

countries such as Germany to progressively amend their strategic culture, as illustrated by its recent commitment in Mali.

- Brexit means that the EU has to fill the vacuum left by Britain's departure, but it is also an opportunity, since it has removed the UK's veto on some key decisions, such as the European Headquarters (Military Planning and Conduct Capability).

- Finally, Donald Trump's election increased the uncertainty vis-à-vis the US commitment in Europe and led even the most Atlanticist states to acknowledge that the EU has to be able to rely on itself.

This context has led to some important recent initiatives.

First, the EDF is a European Commission initiative, initially prepared by Commissioner Bieńkowska. The goal is to fund defence research and development from the EU budget. This represents a major shift and makes the Commission a major new actor in a sector that has traditionally been strictly intergovernmental. The fact that she is Polish actually helped Commissioner Bieńkowska to convince Member States that the fund would not just serve the interests of big Member States. It is also interesting to notice that, in her presentation, she used the traditional French concept of "strategic autonomy," which illustrates a certain ideological convergence at the European level, fostered by the new strategic environment: "Europe must become a security provider. The Fund will support collaborative research in defence and the joint development of defence capabilities. It will therefore be a game changer for the EU's strategic autonomy."⁶

Second, the recent launch of PESCO also illustrates a certain tension among Member States' preferences and expectations. PESCO was initially a German, French, Italian and Spanish initiative, based on a provision of the Lisbon Treaty allowing some Member States to establish a more committed defence cooperation framework. The Germans essentially saw PESCO as a way to strengthen European political integration. Consequently, they wanted the framework to be inclusive, and they succeeded, as 25 Member States eventually joined the initiative.

On the other hand, France wanted the states' mutual commitments to be ambitious, in particular, in terms of their contribution to military

6. European Commission, "A European Defence Fund: €5.5 billion per year to boost Europe's defence capabilities," Brussels, 7 June 2017 (online). Available from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1508_en.htm (Accessed 1 February 2018).

operations. Point 12 of the Council decision reflects this objective, stating that Member States are committed to: "Providing substantial support within means and capabilities to CSDP operations (e.g. EUFOR) and missions (e.g. EU Training Missions)—with personnel, equipment, training, exercise support, infrastructure or otherwise..."⁷

This could be interpreted as a response to France's disillusionment with CSDP operations. Even if this does not necessarily constitute an obligation on Member States, the next time France initiates an EU military operation, it will be able to remind its partners that they have endorsed this formal commitment.

For its part, Poland only reluctantly joined PESCO. The Polish government sent a letter to the EU High Representative, signed by Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz and Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski to clarify Poland's position. This letter has been interpreted by many people as an indication of Poland's lack of good will, or even as a way of imposing caveats and preconditions that could eventually hinder PESCO's development. It is true that Poland was not enthusiastic about PESCO. However, I argue that we have to take Polish demands seriously. The ministers state that PESCO should not just strengthen Member States' capacity in terms of crisis management but also help them prepare for high-intensity conflicts, i.e. territorial defence within the NATO framework. The ministers also state that the EU should adopt a "360-degree approach" to threats and not just focus on Southern crises, but also on the Eastern flank.

It is very important that France hears these concerns, because they reflect a much broader problem. France will never be able to strengthen EU defence cooperation if it only serves its own priorities in Africa. France's disillusionment with the CSDP as well as many Member States' suspicion of the motivations behind past French-led operations can largely be explained by the difficulty of accommodating Member States' different geostrategic priorities. While France is often frustrated by the limited support provided by its partners in Africa, other countries like Poland and the Baltic states fear that prioritizing crisis management in the South could distract efforts to strengthen

7. Council of the European Union, "Council decision establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of Participating Member States," Brussels, 8 December 2017.

territorial defence in the East. This is what I call the EU's "geostrategic dilemma." Because states have different geostrategic priorities, cooperation is hindered by fears of abandonment.⁸ It will only be possible to strengthen European defence cooperation if it is in the interest of all Member States and responds to all of their security concerns. In the words of Maciej Popowski, former Deputy Secretary General for the European External Action Service, "We do not have a choice. We cannot prefer one crisis to another. We have to deal with crises in the East and the South together."⁹

To illustrate the challenge that the geostrategic dilemma presents to European defence cooperation, I will take the example of EUFOR Bangui. At the end of 2013, France intervened in the Central African Republic to disarm violent militias. In January 2014, the EU approved a military operation that aimed at securing the Central African capital of Bangui. France initially provided more than one third of the 677 soldiers, and obtaining other Member States' contributions was an "ordeal," according to one French diplomat.¹⁰ In other Member States, the operation was often regarded as "France's mission." Indeed, the launch of EUFOR Bangui was negotiated in the midst of the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, which led Poland and Romania to waver in their commitment, arguing that it was not the right time to send troops out of Europe. As noted by General Pontières, Commander of EUFOR Bangui:

Initially, there were some very promising opportunities. However, in the meantime, the Ukrainian crisis occurred. We may have little awareness of this in France, but to Central Europe, this crisis is of considerable importance, if only for geographical reasons. It is true that the evolution of

8. Tom Dyson et Theodore Konstantinides, *European Defence Cooperation in EU Law and IR Theory*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; Pierre Haroche, "Interdependence, Asymmetric Crises, and European Defence Cooperation," *European Security*, 26: 2, 2017, p. 226–252.

9. Sargs.lv, "European Security Strategy Has to Be Revised," 19 March 2015 [online]. Available from: http://www.sargs.lv/Zinas/Military_News/2015/02/19-02.aspx#lastcomment (Accessed 1 February 2018).

10. *Le Monde*, "La Géorgie, plus gros contingent des forces européennes en RCA", 2 April 2014 [online]. Available from: http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2014/04/02/la-georgie-plus-gros-contingent-des-forces-europeennes-en-rca_4394323_3212.html (Accessed 1 February 2018).

the international situation has slowed the process and reduced contributions.¹¹

The geostrategic dilemma was thus clearly a hindrance to the EU operation. However, there is another side to the story. In April 2014, as part of NATO's reassurance measures in response to the Ukrainian crisis, France sent *Rafale* jet fighters to Poland to ensure surveillance of the Baltic airspace. At the same time, Estonia was the first EU member state to send troops to the Central African Republic alongside French forces already present in the country. When asked why Estonia intervened in Africa, the Estonian Foreign Minister explicitly cited France's solidarity in the face of the Russian threat. This example demonstrates that transactions can resolve the geostrategic dilemma and allow European states to address the Southern and Eastern threats simultaneously. The French-Estonian transaction was all the more successful because each country had different needs. France did not need jet fighters in Central Africa but troops on the ground; and, for Estonia, jet fighters were more useful to deter Russia than a few soldiers.

In the future, a way to respond to the geostrategic dilemma between the Eastern and Southern flanks could be to systematize this kind of transaction. On the one hand, crisis management in the South requires rapidly deployable intervention forces. On the other hand, Eastern territorial defence requires permanently stationed deterrent forces. Although these two requirements are different, they are not necessarily incompatible with one another. For example, multinational units permanently stationed in Eastern Europe, but rapidly deployable for short overseas missions, could respond simultaneously to both objectives. To that end, the EU could provide an institutional framework within which to facilitate transactions between the Eastern and Southern flanks and ensure the long-term credibility of mutual commitments.

11. *Le Point*, "Centrafrique: Jamais l'Union européenne n'était allée aussi vite", 5 April 2014 [online]. Available from: http://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/jean-guisnel/centrafrique-jamais-l-union-europeenne-n-etait-allee-aussi-vite-05-04-2014-1809380_53.php (Accessed 1 February 2018).

CONCLUSION

European defence cooperation suffers from a geostrategic dilemma between the Eastern and Southern flanks. Even if this tension generates fears of abandonment among Member States, and tends to hinder cooperation, it is also an opportunity for transactions. Only by responding simultaneously to Southern and Eastern threats will recent initiatives such as PESCO succeed in strengthening European defence cooperation.

France and Poland, as the main European security actors in the South and the East, respectively, have a special responsibility in this debate and could eventually become the leading actors in the formalization of an East-South transaction. Certainly, the political mood is currently not favourable to joint French-Polish initiatives. But in the longer term, France and Poland's complementary positions could provide a good basis for an EU-wide compromise, just as French-British complementarity played a decisive role in the emergence of the CSDP, almost twenty years ago.

POLISH ARMED FORCES IN THE EYE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 1990–2017¹

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ABSTRACT

In Poland, three factors have influenced the perception of the armed forces by civilian society: joining NATO, integrating the EU and the end of compulsory military service, but the most important element is that the military had moved away from communism. Today the armed forces are one of the most highly considered institutions in Poland. Historically associated with the survival of the homeland, the armed forces are part of cultural identity. However, armed forces are more supported by the rural male and eastern population. The level of confidence of Poles is ten points lower than the average of EU states, and this applies to all public institutions in the country. The attractiveness of military jobs is high among young people and the new territorial army is perceived positively. The defence policy is approved by the majority of Poles, who support the soldiers, but not necessarily the missions.

1. The following article represents the author's own opinion and should not be treated as an official statement of any public institution.

INTRODUCTION

The following article focuses on one of the aspects of civil-military relations, which is the perception of the military, particularly the Polish Armed Forces, by Polish society. Civil-military relations seem to be one of the fundamental topics of discourse in the modern sociology of the military. Beginning with Max Weber's reflections it was largely developed after the Second World War, especially in the United States.² It was further developed in the US, Canada, Europe and other regions. There are two main works that have defined the field of civil-military relations. The first was Huntington's landmark study, *The Soldier and the State* (1957), and the second was Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1960).³ Both of these texts were followed by studies exploring the relationship between society and the armed forces.⁴

Relations between society and the military may be understood from several different perspectives. Traditional political theories clarify the need for the military's submissive and passive stance towards civil society, especially towards its democratic institutions. Applying the general rules of the principle of the division of powers, military forces and military command should stay as far as possible from the

2. Max Weber's reflection on the interplay of civil and military worlds covers aspects such as the impact of weapon type on social order, the place and status of military men (warriors or soldiers) in the economic and political system or the systemic role of the military in the process political change. See, among others: Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, University of California Press, 1978, p. 149-154, 371-375; Max Weber, *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*, Routledge, 2009, p. 221-224.

3. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Harvard University Press, 1957 and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: Social and Political Portrait*, The Free Press, 1960.

4. See Stanisław Andreski, *Military Organization and Society*, University of California Press, 1968; Charles C. Moskos (ed.), *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment*, Sage, 1971; Charles C. Moskos, Frank R. Wood, (eds), *The Military: More Than Just a Job?*, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988; Charles C. Moskos, *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military*, Russell Sage Found, 1970; Charles C. Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in the Military Organization," *Armed Forces & Society*, 4:1, 1977, p. 41-50; David R. Segal, "Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis," *Armed Forces & Society*, 12:3, 1986, p. 351-375; James Burk, "Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society," *Armed Forces & Society*, 19:2, 1993, p. 167-185.

societal mechanisms governing the civilian population. From another point of view, the consequences of such isolation of the military and its personnel may be quite harmful. When isolated from other institutions, military personnel may lose their commitment to the principal values of democracy. This turning of soldiers' community into a kind of isolated "caste" may be seen as a serious threat to the legitimacy of the armed forces and their role in society. Theoretical and empirical works focusing on different contexts have been accompanied by studies on relations between the military and society in Western democracies. Interactions between the military and society were studied under communist regimes, in postcolonial environment and more generally—in societies facing systemic transformation.


The latter case may be the most appropriate perspective for the study of links between the military and society in Poland. While relations between the military institutions and civilian democratic institutions in Poland during a systemic transformation would make for an interesting study, I would like to focus on the general attitude of Polish society towards the armed forces post-1990. In general, links between the military forces and the rest of society are shaped by such factors as emotions, feelings of integrity, rational calculation and also certain basic needs, such as the need for security. Among Polish society, nowadays, as well as in the past, the perception of the military forces is an important part of Polish patriotism. Images of the Polish Army and Polish soldiers are fixtures of Polish national identity that have positive connotations and are seen as crucial figures of the symbolic repertoire of patriotic discourse. In parallel, since 1944, the military forces in Poland were perceived as a part of the communist regime, and its commanders were responsible for introducing martial law in 1981, which stopped the revolution launched by the "Solidarność" movement.⁵

5. Modelling methods used by CBOS in the years 1989 and 1990 show that the Army was perceived by public opinion as a part of the communist regime. On the map of a social perception it was located close to the Communist Party and State Television (CBOS 1990). A similar analysis, repeated in the year 2008, shows a fundamental change. On the map of social perception, the Army moved to a neutral position and was no longer associated with the "political world".

ARMED FORCES IN THE EYES OF SOCIETY IN POLAND

A brief look at the data of CBOS (Centre for Research in Social Opinion), one of the most respected research institutes in Poland, demonstrates positive and stable public opinion of the country's armed forces. The percentage of positive assessments in the years 1990–2017 was never lower than 50%, and during most of the period was hovering around 70%.

Chart. Evaluation of institutions' performance: armed forces, Poland 1990–2017



Source: Author, on the basis of: CBOS *Oceny działania instytucji publicznych, komunikaty z lat 1990-2017*

Attitudes towards military forces can be understood in the context of important milestones of systemic transformation. There are at least three important occurrences that constitute important turning points in the political process that might have shaped the attitudes of Polish society towards the military forces. Among these, the first is Poland's entry into the NATO alliance in the year 1999, which symbolized the breaking of ties with Poland's communist past. The second historical event is Poland's entry into the EU, an event that was met with positive public opinion and the legitimization of all governmental intuitions. The third event was the suspension of obligatory military service in 2009, which impacted the perception of the armed forces, especially by young men. On studying the survey data (see Chart 1), the two first-mentioned historical events (entering NATO and entering the EU)

did not have an impact on attitudes towards the military within Polish society. After entering NATO, the percentage of positive evaluations of the military forces even dropped, before stabilizing around 70%. Neither did entry into the EU change attitudes towards the armed forces to a significant degree.

Some research supports hypotheses as to the relationship between the proportion of soldiers in an entire population (societal militarism level) or the rate of conscription and the general influence of the military in society, as measured by the level of military expenditure in the annual growth rate.⁶ The suspension of conscription in Poland in 2009 was a continuation of earlier decisions. The whole process was shaped by a doctrinal choice—orientation towards the model of fully professional armed forces—as well as by political decisions based on a growing resistance against the compulsory conscription of male youth. Since 1990, the rigor of obligatory military service had been declining, and time reduced—from 24 months in 1990 to 9 months in 2008. In 1998, the campaign called “citizen in uniform” was launched. Its main goal was to reduce the privileges of military commanders to physically discipline conscripts, and in general—to improve the condition of service, and to ensure the protection of the rights of conscripts. In the case of Poland, since the end of obligatory military service, one can observe a limited decline in the percentage of positive assessments of the military forces. There was also an increase in the percentage of people who were unsure of their opinions (“hard to say” option). This change can be seen as a consequence of loosening social ties between the military and society, based on the repeated mass participation of citizens in military structures.

Thus far, the military area remains one of the critical elements of Polish cultural identity for the majority of the population.⁷ The Polish Armed Forces are considered to be one of the most respected institutions in the country, very often outstripping the police, the government and parliament. The importance of the military is visible even at the individual level. Time in military service was

6. Patrick James and Seung-Wan Choi, *Civil-military dynamics, democracy, and international conflict: A new quest for international peace*, Springer, 2005, p. 117.

7. See Jerzy Wiatr, “The Public Image of the Polish Military Past and Present,” in Catherine McArdle Kelleher (eds), *Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives*, Sage, 1974, p. 199-202.

commonly perceived as a man's rite of passage and played a role in the process of building self-esteem, especially in lower-educated and rural communities in Poland.⁸

ATTITUDES TOWARDS ARMY IN POLAND IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

When assessed in terms of institutional trust, the armed forces in Poland are one of the most trusted institutions. The latest Eurobarometer data shows that Polish Military Forces are trusted by 65% and the Police by 53% of Poles.⁹ The percentage of respondents who trust democratic institutions (such as the local authorities, public administration, legal institutions, the central government or parliament) does not exceed 45% and in some cases only reaches the level of 25%. The Eurobarometer data shows that there are specific factors influencing the level of trust of the armed forces in Poland. Trust levels are higher among men, inhabitants of eastern regions of the country as well as those living in rural areas. As in all large and medium-sized European countries, in Poland there is a correlation between political self-identification and the level of trust in the army: people who identify their political attitudes as "left-wing" are less likely to trust the armed forces.¹⁰

The share of people who trust the armed forces in Poland, in the year 2017 equalled 65% which was 9 percentage points below the EU 28 average (74%). There are similar levels of trust in the army in Sweden, Latvia, Croatia and Italy. Eurobarometer data shows that the level of declared mistrust is also high. Only six European countries/regions¹¹ present a level of mistrust of the army that is higher than in Poland (29%).¹²

8. See Marcin Sińczuch, *Inicjacyjny aspekt zasadniczej służby wojskowej: Raport z badań jakościowych—materiał do użytku wewnętrznego*, Department of Social Relations, Ministry of National Defence of Poland, 1996.


9. Data source: Eurobarometer 87.3 (2017).

10. This interdependence occurs at the statistically significant level in such countries as Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Spain, but is absent in the Netherlands or Sweden, Data source: Eurobarometer 87.3 (2017).

11. Bulgaria (35%), Croatia (29%), Cyprus(34%), Hungary (34%) Slovakia (34%) and Eastern Germany (39%).

12. Data source: Eurobarometer 87.3 (2017).

Chart. Trust in public institutions in selected European countries: Army



Source: Author's on the basis of: Eurobarometer 87.3 (2017)

The observation above should be interpreted with regards to the cultural context of the trust level in Polish society. Several studies show that Poles are among the less "trusting" nations in Europe. This is especially explicit in terms of institutional trust.¹³ The level of trust in public institutions in Poland is slightly lower than the average level in Europe. In Poland, more than half of the population declares its trust in at least 4 of the 8 domestic public/democratic/political institutions. The level of institutional trust places Poland above such countries as Greece, Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Croatia or Latvia, but below the majority of the North Western member states of the EU.

13. See also: Jacek Kochanowicz, "Trust, confidence, and social capital in Poland: A historical perspective" in: *Proceedings British Academy*, vol. 123, 2004, p. 63-84; Henryk Domański and Andrzej Rychard, "Wstęp: o naturze legitymizacji i jej kryzysów," in Andrzej Rychard and Henryk Domański (eds), *Legitymizacja w Polsce. Nieustający kryzys w zmieniających się warunkach*, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2010; Andrzej Rychard, "Old and new hypotheses about legitimacy and trust," in Paweł B. Sztabiński, Henryk Domański and Franciszek Sztabiński (eds), *Hopes and Anxieties in Europe. Six Waves of the European Social Survey*, Peter Lang Edition, 2015; Andrzej Rychard, "Czy nowy kryzys legitymizacji i stary deficyt zaufania? Wstępne refleksje i empiryczne ilustracje" in Paweł Sztabiński (ed.), *Polska-Europa. Wyniki Europejskiego Sondażu Społecznego 2002–2015*, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2015.

MILITARY CAREER AND ARMY'S VIEW AMONG POLISH YOUTH

The Polish armed forces, which offers more than a hundred thousand positions for professional soldiers and four thousand jobs for civilian personnel, is an important player in the labour market. Although compulsory military service was perceived by more educated youth as a kind of interruption to the course of life, for their less educated colleagues, it offered a chance to gain professional skills and experience. The professionalization of military service in 2009 turned military service at the lowest positions¹⁴ into a relatively attractive job option.¹⁵ The perception of military service as an area of opportunity for a professional career, characterized by a relatively high and stable income, preferable pension regulations and housing benefits, also appeared in the testimony of candidates of Polish military schools and academies. In the years 2008–2017, military academies and officer schools were among the most popular higher education centres in Poland, with the number of candidates for military faculties generally exceeding 15 per position.¹⁶

The percentage of young people who are determined to pursue careers in the military hovers around 2% of the population. This level is comparable with the percentage of youth entrepreneurs. Nowadays, ten years after the suspension of compulsory military training, the share of young people interested in temporary, voluntary participation in military training is growing. More than 24% of university students have declared their willingness to participate in newly launched programs of voluntary military training. This data suggests that there is a growing interest in and support of the army among younger genera-


14. As service in the rank of a private.

15. See Andrzej Jeziński, *Stosunek młodzieży akademickiej do wojska i służby wojskowej: Sprawozdanie z badań*, WIBS, 2003; Adam Kołodziejczyk, *Wojsko a społeczeństwo: Kulturowe podobieństwa i odmienności studentów uczelni cywilnych i wojskowych; Sprawozdanie z badań*, WIBS, 2004; Marian Kloczkowski, Janusz Zajdzik, Marcin Sińczuch, *Proces profesjonalizacji w percepcji żołnierzy zawodowych: Sprawozdanie z badań*, WBBS, 2008.

16. See Marcin Sińczuch, *Ocena jakości kształcenia w uczelniach wojskowych w opinii podchorążych: Sprawozdanie z badań*, WBBS, 2008; Marcin Sińczuch, Michał Weseliński and Łukasz Kiciński, *Ocena jakości kształcenia w szkołach podoficerskich w opinii elewów oraz ocena przydatności wykształcenia wojskowego w realiach służby w opinii oficerów WP: Sprawozdanie z badań*, WBBS, 2009.

tions. In addition, the idea of establishing a new form of military service in the National Defence Forces is being met with high levels of public support.

Chart. Plans for the future of higher secondary school students (16–17 years old)



Source: Author, on the basis of: CBOS *Opinie młodzieży, komunikaty z lat 1992-2016*

But at the other end of the continuum, there is still a growing phenomenon of “californization,” i.e. a set of attitudes that is based on a collective lack of interest and refusal to engage in any kind of trouble-making activity (such as involvement in military intervention or missions abroad).¹⁷ Ten years ago, some data showed that the armed forces and the military were seen as inconsistent with modern society, culture, lifestyles and values, and even technologically backward.¹⁸

17. Brian Fay, *Contemporary philosophy of social science: A multicultural approach*, Blackwell, 1996, p. 7.

18. See Millward Brown SMG/KRC dla MON, *Badanie kampanii promocyjno-informacyjnej, “Zawód żołnierz”: Raport z badania jakościowego i ilościowego dla Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej*, Ministry of National Defence of Poland, 2008.

Now this perspective is changing. In general, the most important decisions in Polish defence policy are supported by the majority of society. This support especially applies to the stationing of NATO forces on Polish territory, investment in the domestic defence industry and even an increase in the country's defence spending. At the same time, a large part of society especially women, feel increasingly remote from the military sphere. The large-scale involvement of Polish Army in military missions abroad, mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan, had influenced the attitudes of the public opinion.¹⁹ Affirmation of soldiers' bravery and sacrifice was accompanied by a general lack of support and sometimes even a lack of understanding of the necessity and purpose of the military missions far from Poland and how they related to Polish national interests.

CONCLUSION

From the perspective of civil-military relations, the current challenge for Polish political and military elites is to keep, enlarge and redefine the present social bonds between the military and society. The core issue for building active social participation in the national defence system is the development of new forms of involvement—such as temporal forms of service, training that allows those involved to gain useful military skills and bringing the military to a wider social audience. In addition, the linking of the military with current political polarizations and conflicts might inadvertently increase mistrust. And, last but not least, the final challenge that should be mentioned here is to build a political consensus that will lead to the stabilization of perspectives of the Armed Forces as well as to its systematic and long-term development in Poland.

19. Marcin Sińczuch, Marian Kloczkowski and Mariusz Wachowicz, "Polish military forces in peacekeeping missions and military operations other than war: experiences after 2000", *Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos*, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2009, p. 157, 170-171.

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY IN FRANCE: A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP

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ABSTRACT

This article considers two dimensions of civil-military relations in France. First, the relations between the military and the society taken as a whole, measured through public opinion polls of the image of the armed forces and the legitimacy of their missions. Second, the relations between military chiefs and civilian decision makers, assessed through qualitative research based on interviews and content analysis of media reports, public statements and memoirs. In comparison with the sixties, public opinion of the military has improved in every respect. The image of the military has become very positive over the past two decades, and the French have great confidence in the military compared to other institutions. The whole spectrum of military missions is perceived as legitimate, even though the French are more in favour of

the missions of protection of the national territory or of French citizens than of missions abroad. Concerning the civil-military relations at the decision-making level, the Algerian War legacy is never very far from the narratives and social representations of the actors. The relations between the top ranks of the military and decision makers are always complex to apprehend, but they have significantly improved since the mid-nineties, essentially because of the numerous military interventions, progress in the training of high-ranking officers, enhancing the skills needed to have an influence and a redefined role of the Chief of Defence Staff since 2005.

INTRODUCTION

Because the relation between the armed forces and society is rooted in its history, each country has its own way to envision it. In France, this issue is related to a worry reflected in the fear of a growing gap between the military and the population that would lead to the latter's ignorance and indifference towards servicemen. The concern regarding this gap has increased with the shift to an all-volunteer force decided by President Chirac in 1996. Since then, as soon as a problem appears among young people, relating to national cohesion or the disintegration of the sense of citizenship, many civilian authorities refer to the "old and good time" of conscription and would very much like to see its return. The military is aware of the positive role that conscription may have had in the past, but much more cautious about its usefulness today to solve the problems of integration in French society.

Relations between the armed forces and society include many aspects of the life of the military institution and of its personnel. Three levels of analysis can help to describe these aspects: the first level concerns the relations between the military and society taken as a whole. Civil—military relations at this level of analysis can be assessed by opinion surveys, among other means. The second level deals with the military as an institution and its relations with other institutions like the media, the education system, the other agencies in charge of the security, etc. The third level concerns the relations between civilian and military decision makers. This article will successively develop the first and the third levels.

THE MILITARY WITHIN FRENCH SOCIETY

In France, the relations between the armed forces and society have never been as positive as they are today, but this has not always been the case. Historians agree that in the 1960s, at the end of the wars of decolonization in Indochina and Algeria, civil—military relations were in crisis. There was a wide gap between the French and their army. The military institution was isolated and alienated. Since the nineties, periodical surveys are available for measuring the evolution of these relations, and they show how much the image of the military within society has improved.

An Image That Has Become Very Positive Over the Past Two Decades

The 40-year period from 1962 (independence of Algeria) to 2002 (full professionalization of the armed forces) has witnessed the gradual establishment of a more confident relationship between the armed forces and the nation. In the aftermath of the war in Algeria, the military was an isolated institution, and at the end of the sixties, the French were mostly opposed to the use of force. In 1973, young men demonstrated in large numbers against a law called *loi Debré*, depriving them of some rights concerning the draft, especially the reprieve for studies. In 1974, conscripts signed a petition and formed committees of soldiers—a forbidden practice—for more rights. In 1975, there was the nonviolent but massive mobilization against the expansion of a military camp in Larzac, a south-eastern agricultural area of France. These mobilizations revealed the distance between the aspirations of young people and what the armies were offering them during their military service. The political change in 1981 gradually reversed this trend, and the majority of the public opinion became gradually in favour of the nuclear deterrent and accepted the military institution and military personnel. Since then, the right/left division has only a marginal impact on defence issues, a field where consensus prevails.

In comparison with the sixties, public opinion on the military has improved in every respect. In the most recent survey available, 87% of the French have a good image of the armed forces. In 1991, the first year from which annual surveys are available, there were only 74% of

positive opinions, a lower percentage but nevertheless representing three out of four French people. Over the past ten years, positive opinions have slowly increased from 70 per cent in 1990 to 87 per cent in 2016 whereas negative views have declined from 22 per cent to less than 10 per cent.¹

The French have great confidence in the military, placing it at the top of the legal, governing and political institutions, and their confidence rate has grown from 81% in 2008 to 91% in 2013, while the judiciary has experienced a reverse trend, falling from 63% to 54% over the same period of time, and the police, which is a national institution in France, has remained stable with a 76% to 78% confidence rate.² Another barometer gives the same trends: the armed forces, together with hospitals, receive the best confidence marks, whereas the media and political parties have very low scores; and the school system and justice are in between.³

The army is the institution with the greatest capital of trust in Europe, with a strong majority of people declaring they have confidence in their armies, ahead of the police and judiciary. In November 2016, the European average in the EU was 74% of respondents who say they have confidence in the army, up by 4 points compared to the survey of November 2010. France is the country with the highest level of confidence, ahead of the UK, Germany, Spain and Italy. The EU average stood at 73% in November 2016.⁴

Until the early 1980s, opinions on military issues differed significantly according to the age of the respondents, their socio-professional level and their political allegiance. These distinctions have been greatly reduced since then. Today, young people share the opinions of their elders. They are even the category presenting the strongest confidence. Their confidence rate has increased by 14 per cent between

1. Cf. : [file:///Users/admin/Downloads/La%20D%C3%A9fense%20dans%20l'opinion%20des%20fran%C3%A7ais%202017%20\(4\).pdf](file:///Users/admin/Downloads/La%20D%C3%A9fense%20dans%20l'opinion%20des%20fran%C3%A7ais%202017%20(4).pdf).

2. IFOP opinion poll for *Journal du Dimanche*, July 2013: http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2292-1-study_file.pdf.

3. Baromètre de la confiance politique du CEVIPOF : <http://www.cevipof.com/fr/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique-du-cevipof/resultats-1/vague8/>.

4. Ministère des Armées, “La perception de la défense dans l’opinion publique européenne et chez les jeunes,” *Annuaire statistique de la défense*, 2017.

2010 and 2016, probably due to the terror attacks in France in 2015 and 2016.

So, for the past twenty years, the proportion of French people having a good opinion of their armed forces has varied between 77% and 87%. It has not fallen below 80% since 2000. This good perception is reinforced by positive considerations about the value of military personnel and the quality and level of their training, since two thirds of the French population believe that these three factors are strong characteristics of the military, considering it to be professional, effective and responsive.

The public’s opinions of the military represent a general and slightly rough indicator of the state of civil—military relations. In the form of a barometer, the surveys on the image of armies are useful because they can measure changes in public opinion and serve as warnings. If the majority of the opinions were negative, or if people declared themselves as anti-militarists, these would be signs of an estrangement or even of an antagonism between the military and society. This is not the case anymore for a long time.

The Legitimacy of the Entire Spectrum of Military Missions

The legitimacy of the use of force is another key factor in assessing civil—military relations, and this issue can be analysed by asking if the military is considered to be involved in useful missions and under what circumstances those missions are accepted and legitimized.

Since 1990, following the collapse of the bipolar world order and the multiplication of conflicts that this has generated, the military interventions decided by France have followed one another at a steady pace. As we can observe with hindsight, the French have approved these missions since the beginning of the nineties, and we can conclude that the use of force in interventions abroad is considered legitimate in France.

A large majority of French declares itself in favour of the ongoing interventions: in general, at least 60% of the people support them. This has been the case for Bosnia (68% of support in May 1994) and Kosovo (58% in April 1999), for the intervention in Darfur in 2007 (62% in favour). More recently, 66% of French people were in favour of the

intervention in Libya in March 2011. In January 2013, a poll about the military intervention in Mali against the Islamist armed movements showed that 75% of French people were in favour of it. In 2016, 75% of the French approved the intervention against ISIS in Iraq and 70% supported the air strikes in Syria⁵.

The support for external military interventions does not depend on the political or socio-professional affiliation of the respondents and in general it is reborn with each new intervention. So, the support for the intervention in Mali and the political consensus about military interventions had been renewed after having been seriously weakened during the last years of the war in Afghanistan. This dimension characterizes France and distinguishes it from many of its allies. The Germans are reluctant to send their troops abroad and they generally have a very strict mandate with stricter rules of engagement than those of other contingents. In Canada, soldiers are considered as peacekeepers, and the government had to withdraw combat troops from Afghanistan as early as 2011, well ahead of the other nations of the coalition because of the lack of public support. The British were more cautious about the engagement of their troops in Afghanistan than the French, but, on the other hand, they showed unconditional support to their soldiers. The way in which a country's engagement in overseas operations is perceived depends largely on its history as well as on the perception of the threats. As such, France and the United Kingdom have a long experience of external missions. In Germany, on the other hand, this practice is more recent since it was only authorized by the Constitution in 1994.

The repeated terror attacks since 2015 have changed the perception of French people in terms of threats: terrorism has become the first cause of concern, especially for young people.⁶ External missions are no longer the only missions in which France deploys large volume

5. Barbara Jankowski, "L'Érosion du soutien de l'opinion publique à la guerre en Afghanistan. L'impact des récits," in Jean Baechler (dir.), *L'Arrière*, Éditions Hermann, 2017, p. 191-210 ; "L'opinion des Français sur leurs armées," in Eric Letonturier (dir.), *Guerre, armées et communication*, Éditions du CNRS, coll. "Les essentiels d'Hermès," 2017, p. 81-98.

6. It must nevertheless be emphasized that the French did not experience terrorist attacks for the first time in 2015 or even in 2012. From 1985-86 and then in 1995-96, France was hit many times by bloody and deadly attacks. This is not a disruptive and recent phenomenon. However, those attacks occurred twenty years ago.

of troops. Since 2015, the armies are committed to the protection of the national territory. However, the French have long considered that the military must first be used to protect the national territory. The three missions perceived as top priorities for the armed forces (for more than 80% of the people) are first, providing assistance to the French population in case of disaster, second, wiping out the hotbeds of international terrorism and third, protecting French territory and securing the population.

According to the general public, the most legitimate missions are less combat oriented. The military is perceived as useful to deal with contingencies on the national territory. The highest approval rating during the period from 1997, when this item was first included, up to the present day is for missions that help the French public in time of emergency. The military is perceived as more useful at home than abroad and domestic missions are more favoured than missions abroad.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AT THE DECISION-MAKING LEVEL

Another level of analysis of the relations between the armed forces and society concerns the civil-military relations at the top level of the hierarchy, meaning the relation between civilian decision makers and military high command. The study of the relations between the civilian elites and the military high command is at the roots of Anglo-Saxon military sociology, initiated by Samuel Huntington in the late fifties. In France, there are few studies on this specific dimension, and the field remains much less explored compared to the abundant literature across the Atlantic.⁷ The issue of civilian control on the military is the major question structuring the research in this field: how civilians control the military in democracies?

The Algerian War Legacy Still Present in Narratives

In France the relations between the civilian and military elites are very often analysed in the light of the events that occurred during

7. With the exception of a few researchers, such as Samy Cohen, Bastien Iron-delle, Jean Joana and more recently, Grégory Daho.

the Algerian War between 1954 and 1962, more than fifty-five years ago. In fact, when media or even scholars want to portray civil-military relations today, they commonly compare them to the period that witnessed the greatest intrusion of the military into politics than ever before or since. The events that led to such an extreme politicization of the high-ranking military help to understand the decision-making structures for defence policy initiated under the Fifth Republic and the restricted role played by the military since 1958. The configuration of civil-military relations specific to the Algerian war, with generals disobeying the civilian power is very present in the media narratives. For example, if an officer expresses himself, observers very often wonder about the legitimacy of his speech, with reference to the war in Algeria.

The war in Algeria saw the engagement of the military in politics, whereas they had been completely subordinated to the civilian authority during the Third Republic. This politicization has its roots in the weakness of the political institutions of the Fourth Republic and the powers given to the military far from their core role, assigning them the right to intervene in many fields of public policy.

Two major events took place, involving top ranking military personnel who tried to force the political authorities to adopt a policy more suitable to their own views on what the future of French Algeria should be. The first event started with a demonstration organized in Algiers on May 13, 1958, which led to a regime change because de Gaulle was asked to come back to power. He then immediately launched a process to replace the existing Constitution by a new one and giving birth to the Fifth Republic. Today, the French state is still ruled by the institutions crafted sixty years ago. The second event took place in April 1961 and is known as the "Putsch," instigated by four generals. The coup lasted no longer than four days but provoked a clash between de Gaulle, the elected President at that time, and the military, prompting a deep reform of the institution.

The circumstances under which the Fifth Republic was established influenced the 1958 Constitution by giving the major power to the executive branch at the expense of the Parliament. France has still the same constitutional regime founded by de Gaulle, only very slightly amended as regards defence policy. The relations between the military

and the decision-making level have lastingly improved during the Fifth Republic, the civilians having definitely taken over the military.

The Constitution adopted in 1958 has seen seven presidents, various left and right governments and three "cohabitation" (President and Parliament on opposed sides of the political spectrum) but the military loyalty towards the civilian decision makers has not been questioned again.⁸ The constitutional framework establishing the supremacy of the policy maker is not only accepted but fully approved and seen as legitimate by the military: "In the French system the real leader is the President. The President controls and monitors defence issues. The President is the boss, because Article 15 of the Constitution specifies that he/she chairs the defence councils. All the decisions are taken there" (a former Chief of Defence Staff).

Improved Civil-Military Relations Since the Mid-Eighties

Since the end of the nineties the military advisers of the decision makers have gained influence, and this trend increased, at least until the election of François Hollande in 2012. A few factors have contributed to inducing the high-ranking military staff to participate more largely in the decision-making process since the mid-nineties: the numerous military interventions, which are very diverse in their scopes and intensity, the multinational operations with increasing participation of staff from NATO and European headquarters, progress in the training of high-ranking officers, enhancing the skills needed to have an influence and a redefined role of the Chief of Defence Staff since 2005.

Not only have relations been smoothed, and the civilian authority is considered as highly legitimate, but also the role of the military chiefs who advise decision-makers is now far from being insignificant. Since the mid-nineties, their influence has increased, mostly because they have regained civilian confidence and because the high volume of military interventions has again given them a role in the decision-making process.

8. Samy Cohen, "Le pouvoir politique et l'armée," *Pouvoirs*, 2008, n° 125, p. 19-28.

A reform concerning the role of the Chief of Defence Staff and his relations with the President, with the Minister of Defence, and with the chiefs of Staff of the three services has also been predominant in this change, both as driving force and consequence of improving relations. The attributions of the Chief of the Defence Staff were expanded in 2005 and in 2009, conferring overall authority over the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air force. This reform was needed because the three services were in competition for budget resources and the choices were not coordinated. Effectively, the Chief of Defence Staff has now become the exclusive interlocutor of the President.

The number of military chiefs in relation to civilian decision makers is very low, and strictly speaking there are only two who have personal access to the President: one is the Chief of Defence Staff and the other is the President's Chief of Military staff.⁹ This is due to the French constitutional framework. The President is the Commander-in-Chief and is in direct relation with the Chief of the Defence Staff, who commands the troops in military interventions, while the personal counselor of the President has no other role than advising.

When the essential actors of a decision-making process are in small numbers, their relations become even more important and the quality of interpersonal links a determining factor. But what constitutes good-quality relations at this level and in this context, and how do they become possible? The relationship between the President and his advisers, but also between the two advisors (Chief of the Defence Staff and Personal advisor) must be based on trust and loyalty. Trust is something that the military and civilian actors build with time. However, some skills are major assets, such as a good knowledge of the politico-military system.

In 60 years with the same constitutional framework, France has experienced many types of relations between the military leaders involved in defence decision-making and the civilian authorities. Relations have been more or less harmonious or conflicting, but decisions have always been in the hands of the President. There was a particularly harmonious period in the late 1990s and 2012 due to the personalities involved.

9. In French: the CEMP, Chef d'état-major particulier du président de la République.

Well-balanced civil-military relations are an objective because they condition the quality of decision-making processes. The quality of relations between civilians and the military depends on a balance between operational efficiency, which presupposes an influence upstream of decision-making, and the effective subordination of the military to decision makers, a balance that is clearly impossible to define rigidly *a priori*.

Harmonious relationships do not conform to unique standards, and there is no consensus on what good relations between civilians and the military really are. The factors that influence the nature of civil-military relations are multiple, as shown by Dale Herspring.¹⁰ The recognition given by civilian leaders to military personnel and especially in this case to the chiefs of staff, the good preparation of military leaders for civilian decision-making, a world apart from them, the respect of military culture and symbols by civilians, the absence of interference by civilians in the management of military careers or the way in which the expression of the military is managed. The interactions are not similar in all countries, periods of time and strategic contexts.

To return to the case of France, relations have improved significantly, even if they experience ups and downs according to the personalities of each of the actors. The 2000s were probably more harmonious than the beginning of the current term. But what we find at the heart of the tensions between military leaders and decision makers are two dimensions, which undoubtedly characterize France: mutual trust, and the related difficulty of changing the social representations of the military among civilians, especially the perceptions concerning the loyalty of high-ranking officers.

CONCLUSION

During the past twenty-five years, a relationship of trust has been built between the French people and their army. The military institution is now perceived very positively, and the majority of the French people is in favour of the military interventions in which France is engaged.

10. Dale Herspring, *Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility: A Four Nation Study*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, p. 273-274.

However, we also know that French public opinion favours the rescue missions of the population in case of disaster and the defence of the national territory. It is this type of mission that has always been at the forefront of what the French expect of their army. This is true for the strong adherence to the mission of protection of the national territory devolved to the military since the attacks of January 2015.

The link between the armies and young people is now the opposite of what it was in the 1970s. Recent insights tell us that confidence in the military institution has increased among young people, who are less averse to order and authority than is commonly believed, and that the feeling of national pride is in fact on the rise. Ethics and social utility, flagship values for the military, attract young people who are searching for ideals such as collective commitment or moral altruism.

In the eyes of many foreign observers, France is the only state among western democracies where the military has either attempted or succeeded in taking power several times, but it is at the same time a country where civil-military relations have been extremely stable for fifty years and where civilian control is perceived as fully legitimate by the military.



FRANCE AND POLAND FACING THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Barbara JANKOWSKI and Amélie ZIMA (eds.)

The purpose of this study is to confront the Polish and French academic approaches on the evolution of the security environment in the late 2010s. For several years now, the states of the European continent have been facing renewed tensions and political uncertainties: the annexation of Crimea, and the war in the Ukrainian Donbass. Besides, the election of Donald Trump has instilled doubt about solidarity among allies. Brexit poses a challenge to the construction of the European Union which means that the debate on the EU's future no longer only concerns the practical criteria for deepening European integration but also the appropriateness of this integration. In this context, this study aims to present the views and analysis on two major states of the European Union and NATO: Poland and France. This publication gathers together eight articles that were first presented in a conference organized in Paris, at the École militaire on November 24, 2017, by the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM). In the first part, the study provides an analysis of Polish and French security strategies. In the second part, the authors study the changes that have taken place in the transatlantic relationship, NATO and the EU with the election of Trump, Brexit and the renewal of European defence. Finally, the third part of the study is devoted to the relations between the armed forces and society in both countries.

É T U D E S